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INTRODUCTION .... 
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC or 
Commission), as well as advisory panels in two states (New York and 
Maryland) have recently issued recommendations urging new 
regulation of research with decisionally impaired individuals.• These 
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1See NATIONAL BIOE'IHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, REsEARCH INVOLWm PEr.S!mS WITH 
MENTAL DISORDERS 1HAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING ChPACm' 2 (1998) [hereinafter 
NBAC REPoRT]; NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEAL1H ADVISORY WORK GROUP 0~~ 
HUMAN SUBJECT REsEARCH INvOLVING 1HE PROTEC'IID CLASSES, RECO~l:MENDATIO~<S ON 1HE 
OVERSIGHT OF HUMAN SUBJECT REsEARCH INvOLVING 1HE PROTECIED CLASSES 28-33 (1998} 
[hereinafter NEW YORK REPoRT]; and JACK SCHWAR1Z, OFFlCE OF 1HE r-.fAR\'1...&\liD ATIORNEY 
GENERAL, FINAL REPoRT OF1HEATIORNEY GENERAL'S Woromm GROUP ON REsEARCH 
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recent governmental initiatives have resurrected a quarter-century old 
policy debate over whether this kind of research should be governed by 
regulations beyond those applicable to all human subjects. 
Considerations underlying the central question include how the 
population needing special regulatory protection should be defined, 
what limitations should be placed on the risk to which subjects are 
exposed, and how much discretion about these matters should be left to 
research investigators and local review boards. 
Fueling this debate is a core ethical issue: how can research with 
subjects who are unable to consent be justified? The Nuremberg Code, 
a post-war foundational document regarding research ethics, states that 
the "voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."2 
"This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give 
consent.. .. "3 This language effectively rules out research involving 
decisionally incapacitated subjects and is cited as the central authority 
by those objecting to such research.4 
Yet, the prohibition suggested by the Nuremberg Code is itself 
ethically troublesome to many who point out that, "[b]ecause new 
treatments must eventually be tested in persons suffering from the 
relevant condition, a policy totally excluding incapable subjects from 
research would preclude the development of improved treatment for 
persons with serious psychiatric disorders, dementia, and other 
mentally debilitating conditions."5 A source of authority for those who 
Involving Decisionally Incapacitated Subjects 1 (1998) (on file with the DePaul Journal of 
Health Care Law) [hereinafter Maryland Report]. 
1fie Nuremberg Code {1947), reprinted in JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION Wll1l HUMAN 
BEINGS 305-06 {1971). 
3Id. 
4Some commentators have suggested that the Nuremberg Code's wording, which "seems 
to rule out research with children, with emergency patients, and with the decisionnlly 
impaired," is more expansive than the Code's intended scope. Jonathan D. Moreno, Regulation 
of Research on the Decisionally Impaired: History and Gaps in the Current Regulatory System, 
1 J. HEALm CAREL. & PoL'Y 1, 12 (1998). The judges who issued the decision embodyine 
the Code may only have intended "to rule out non-beneficial and highly risk-y experiments with 
easily coerced subjects such as prisoners." Id. 
5REBECCA DRESSER, NATIONAL BIOETIIICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, Research Involving 
Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Review of Policy Issues and Proposals, in REsEARCH 
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argue that it is ethical to conduct research with the decisionally 
impaired is the Declaration of Helsinki (Declaration).6 The Declaration 
includes in its principles the following: "Where physical or mental 
incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or when the 
subject is a minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces 
that of the subject in accordance with national legislation."' This 
statement appears to assume the passage of national legislation 
permitting family members to consent to participation in research for an 
incapacitated individual. The implication of the statement is that 
sometimes the pursuit of scientific lmowledge justifies research that the 
Nuremberg Code would prohibit, although the Declaration does not 
fully account for the circumstances under which proh.-y consent would 
be ethically permissible.8 
These two documents provide the historical conte:-..1 for the 
examination of subsequent efforts to regulate research with this 
population. Phrases from the documents have become battle flags for 
advocates. Those who believe that research with decisionally impaired 
subjects is ethically suspect, a danger to be avoided, often use the 
Nuremberg Code as the starting point for arguments that this research 
should be severely restricted.9 Those whose premise is that research 
\vith decisionally impaired subjects is ethic.ally permissible, a necessity 
in the fight against serious illness, often use the Declaration of Helsinki 
as the starting point for arguments that this research must not be 
hobbled with restrictions.10 This article will examine how these 
INvOLVING PERsONS WITH .l\1ENTAL DISORDERS 1HAT MAY AFFEcr DEClSIO~~L\KING CAPACIIY 
COMMISSIONED PAPERS 5, 7 {1998) 
6See World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki {1948}, adopted by the World 
Medical Assembly in 1964 and revised in 1975 and 1983, in THE Ennes OF REsEARCH 
INvOLVING HUMAN SUBJECI'S - FACING nm 21ST CamJR.y 433 (Harold Y. Vandcrpool, ed., 
1996). 
'Id. 
B-rhe Declaration suggests that when research is solely for the advancement of scientific 
Imowledge-that is, contains no element of possible direct therapeutic benefit for the 
subjects-"[t]he subjects should be volunteers •••• " /d. 
9See KATZ, supra note 2, at 305-06. 
10See id. 
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seemingly irreconcilable moral views play out in the policymaking 
process. 
Over twenty-five years ago, the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (DHEW) published an early working document 
as a prelude to proposed rules on research with "individuals 
institutionalized as mentally infinn."11 The proposals in the working 
document and proposed rules published a few years later12 would have 
significantly restricted-perhaps even effectively ended-this research. 
The proposals ultimately were abandoned, primarily because of 
comments from researchers that they would be too restrictive and 
burdensome on the research community.13 
Since DHEW abandoned its regulatory effort, little has changed, at 
least in terms of governmental policy directives. Federal regulations 
merely call on Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) to be attentive to the 
need for "additional safeguards ... to protect the rights and welfare" of 
research subjects who "are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue 
influence, such as ... mentally disabled persons .... "14 No state 
comprehensively regulates research with decisionally impaired 
• eli 'dual IS m VI s. 
11See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738, 31,738 (1973) (proposed 
Nov. 16, 1973). 
12See Protection of Human Subjects, Research Involving Those Institutionalized as 
Mentally Infinn, Reports and Recommendations for Public Comment, 43 Fed. Reg. 11327 
(Mar. 17, 1978). 
13See Moreno, supra note 4, at 13. 
1445 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (1999). 
15See Diane E. Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Proxy Consent to Participation of the 
Decisionally Impaired in Medical Research- Maryland's Policy Initiative, 1 J. REALm CARE 
L. & POL'Y 123, 125-26 (1998). 
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1bis article reviews the history of attempts to regulate research 
with the decisionally impaired and examines the question whether the 
recent proposals will merely reprise failed efforts of the past or instead 
mark progress toward consensus on the appropriate level of regulatory 
protection. In so doing, this article addresses some of the significant 
changes in the relevant research, social, and legal arenas during the past 
quarter-century as well as the more complex regulatory research 
environment that exists today, and their likely impact on the 
policymaking outcome. 
EARLY REGULATORY EFFORTS: THE 1970s 
Initial Proposals by the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
The federal government first gave serious attention to the issue of 
research with those lacking decisional capacity in October 1973. At 
that time, the Secretary of DHEW issued a notice of "proposed 
rulemaking" and commented that "DHEW through the National 
Institutes of Health, had appointed a special study group to review and 
recommend policies and special procedures for the protection of 
children, prisoners, and the institutionalized mentally infirm in 
research .... "16 A draft of the study group's report was published in the 
Federal Register in November, 1973.17 The report was not considered 
proposed rulemaking but rather "a draft working document" for public 
review and comment 18 
The draft defined "mentally infirm" as the "mentally ill, the 
mentally retarded, the emotionally disturbed, the psychotic, the senile, 
16protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. 31,738, 31,738 (1973} (proposed Nov. 16, 
1973). 
11See id. 
18See id. The Federal Register Notice, in fact, stntcd "[i]t must be clearly understood by 
the reader that the material that follows is not proposed rulemaking in the technical sens~; and 
is not presented as Departmental, Public Health Service, or NIH policy. Rather it is a draft 
working document on which early public comment and participation is invited." !d. The 
drafters also recognized the controversial nature of the proposal. In the introduction to the 
draft, Robert S. Stone, Director of the National Institutes of Health, commented that "[t]here 
may be elements in the recommendations which will provoke debate and controvccy." Id 
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and others with impairments of a similar nature, residing as patients in 
an institution, regardless of whether or not the individual has been 
determined to be legally incompetent."19 Individuals institutionalized 
as mentally infirm were considered especially in need of protections for 
two reasons. First, they "might lack the ... capacity to comprehend 
relevant information, and to make informed judgments concerning their 
participation" in research.20 Second, ''they experience a diminished 
sense of personal integrity as a result of confinement in an 
• ti'tuti' " 21 ms on. 
Of particular focus was the question of informed consent and how 
it might be obtained in order to conduct research with individuals in 
this category.22 In the section on "general policy considerations," the 
draft stated: 
Whereas it is clear by law that consent of a parent or legal 
representative is valid for established and generally accepted 
therapeutic procedures perfonned on a child or an 
incompetent adult, it is far from clear that it is adequate for 
research procedures. In practice, parental or guardian 
consent generally has been accepted as adequate for 
therapeutic research, although the issue has not been 
defmitively resolved in the courts. When research might 
expose a subject to risk without defined therapeutic benefit 
or other positive effect on that subject's well-being, parental 
or guardian consent appears to be insufficient.23 
19/d. at 31,740. 
20Jd. 
21See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,745. 
22See id. at31,740. 
23 !d. The draft also raised the possibility that legal guardians might not always have the 
best interest of the institutionalized individual foremost in their decisionmaking. Because long-
term management of patients with mental disabilities is very expensive and time-consuming, 
the draft speculated that a research proposal that might "reduce either the expense or the 
supervision required in caring for such persons might be appealing, whether or not there is 
correlative benefitto the patient." !d. at 31,745. 
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The draft concluded that, in general, research on the mentally 
infirm was not acceptable.24 The draft did leave the door open, 
however, for some types of research.25 These included "projects in 
which: the proposed research concerns diagnosis, treatment, prevention, 
or etiology of the disability from which [the subjects] suffer; the 
necessary information can be obtained only from those subjects; or the 
studies concern institutional life per se."26 The draft further required 
that the subject's legal guardian give consent to the individual's 
participation in any research protocol, and that where the individual had 
"sufficient mental competency to understand what [was] proposed and 
to express an opinion as to his or her participation" that the individual 
give his or her consent.27 
In cases where a protocol included mentally infirm subjects, the 
research was to be overseen by a "Protection Committee."23 The 
Protection Committee was to be overseen by an "Organizational 
Review Committee of the institution in which the research" was to be 
conducted or by which the research was sponsored.Z9 The Protection 
Committee30 was to provide guidance in the selection of subjects, 
monitor the progress of the research with special attention to "adverse 
effects on subjects," "evaluat[e] the process and reasonableness of 
consent of the legal guardian and (where applicable) of the subject," 
and advise the legal guardian and subject of the appropriateness of the 
subject's continued participation in the research.31 Members of the 
committee could not have "any association with the research under 
review and the majority of members could not have any association 
24See id. 
25See id. 
26See Protection ofHuman Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,745. 
21Id. at31,748. 
28Id. at31,745. 
29Id. 
30See id. at 31,746 (stating that the Protection Committee was to be composed of at leo.,'"! 
five members who would be competent to "deal with the medical, legal, social and ethical 
issues involved in the [proposed research]"). 
31See Protection of Human Subjects, 38 Fed. Reg. at 31,748. 
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with any organization or individual conducting or supporting the 
[research]. "32 
The Organizational Review Committee, in addition to its 
obligations for all research on human subjects within an institution, was 
to ensure that all aspects of the research would be "ethically appropriate 
for performance on healthy individuals," "conduct at least one on-site 
visit" to the institution where the research was being performed, 
"prepare a report of the visit,"33 and "review and approve or modify the 
procedures proposed by the applicant to be followed by the Protection 
Committee in subject selection and recruitment."34 
Based on critical commentary received on the draft report, in 
August 1974, DHEW published its proposed rules for research on 
vulnerable subjects.35 When these proposed rules were issued, 
however, the agency's Federal Register notice pointed out that 
"[ c ]oincidentally with the development of the notice of proposed 
rulemaking set forth [herein]," the National Research Act was passed 
by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President.36 The Act 
established an eleven-member National Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research.37 The 
Commission was charged with identifying the basic ethical principles 
that should underlie the conduct of human subject research and 
32/d at 31,746. Furthennore, "no more than one-third of the members [could] be 
individuals engaged in research, development, or demonstration activities involving human 
subjects." Id 
33/d. at 31,748. The report was to include "discussion of such matters as living 
conditions, availability of medical care, and quality of food." !d. 
34/d 
35See Protection ofHuman Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,652 (1974) (to be codified 
at 45 C.F.R pt 46) (proposed Aug. 23, 1974). On May 30, 1974, HEW published basic 
regulations governing research with all human subjects, See Protection of Human subjects, 30 
Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46)(proposed May 30, 1974). DHEW 
stated in the preamble to those regulations that it would "propose further rules to provide 
additional protection for research subjects with diminished capacity to provide infonned 
consent, including institutionalized individuals with mental disability." Protection of Human 
Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950, 53,950 (1978) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46) (proposed 
Nov. 17, 1978). 
36See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. at 30,648. 
31See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 201(b)(I), 88 Stat. 342 (1974). 
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developing guidelines for research to assure that it be conducted in 
accordance with these ethical principles.38 More specifically, the 
Commission was required to address research with children, prisoners, 
and those institutionalized as mentally infirm.39 
In light of the four hundred and fifty comments regarding the 
November 1973 proposed guidelines for research on vulnerable 
populations, DHEW made several modifications to its earlier draft.40 
DHEW received over forty comments specifically directed at the 
provisions covering research on the institutionalized mentally infirm.41 
One common criticism was the use of the term "infirm.'142 Commenters 
noted that it reflected an "antiquated notion of mental illness.'143 
DHEW agreed with the concern and changed the term to disabled.44 
In contrast, DHEW rejected suggestions that, in its view, 
weakened what it considered essential protections for those 
institutionalized as mentally infirm.45 For example, some argued that 
the restriction limiting research with this population to protocols that 
related to the particular subject's impairment was too narrow.45 Instead, 
they suggested, the provision should include "any illness from which 
the person suffers so that, for example, an institutionalized mentally 
disabled person with cancer could not be denied the benefits of research 
in cancer therapy.'147 Despite these arguments, the Department 
concluded that research unrelated to the cause of this vulnerable 
population's mental disability was not appropriate because of the 
potential risks to the group.48 As in the earlier draft, research could 
38See id. at§ 202(a)(l)(A)(i). 
39See id. at § 202(a)(2). 
40See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974) (to be codified nt 45 
C.F.R. pl 46) (proposed Aug. 23, 1974). 
41See id. at30,652. 
42See id. 
43See id. 
44See id. 
45See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. nt 30,652. 
46See id. 
41/d. 
48See id. 
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only be performed on those institutionalized as mentally disabled if it 
was "related to the etiology, pathogenesis, prevention, diagnosis, or 
treatment of mental disability or the management, training or 
rehabilitation of the mentally disabled and [sought] information which 
[could] not be obtained from subjects who [were] not institutionalized 
mentally disabled.',.f9 
Furthermore, DHEW retained the original scope of the proposal, 
largely rejecting suggestions that regulations should be established for 
research involving "students, laboratory employees, seriously ill or 
terminal patients, the noninstitutionalized mentally disabled, and other 
special groups."50 DREW's response to this suggestion was that 
"abuses relat[ed] to these groups [were] less evident and that they 
[were] afforded the protection of the existing regulations" governing all 
human subjects.51 DHEW did state, however, that it would consider 
dealing with those who were legally incompetent but not 
institutionalized in a subsequent notice of proposed rulemaking.52 
The National Commission's Process and Recommendations 
DHEW did not move forward in this area while the National 
Commission was performing its own analyses regarding research with 
those institutionalized as mentally infirm. The task of the Commission 
on this topic specifically was to: 
(1) Identify the requirements for informed consent to 
participation in biomedical and behavioral research by the 
institutionalized mentally inftrm, and 
(2) investigate and study biomedical and behavioral 
research conducted or supported under programs 
administered by the Secretary of HEW and involving the 
49/d at 30,655. 
50 See Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. at 30,648. 
51/d 
52 See id at 30,652. 
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institutionalized mentally infirm to determine the nature of 
the consent obtained. 53 
557 
The Commission was to use this information as a basis for making 
recommendations to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
''to assure that biomedical and behavioral research conducted or 
supported under programs administered by him met the requirements 
respecting informed consent identified by the Commission."54 
On AprillO, 1976, the Commission conducted a public hearing on 
the issue of research involving the mentally infirm. 55 Commentators 
included both researchers and advocates for this population. The 
comments reflected the environment in which research on this 
population was conducted and the attitudes of those engaged in this 
research at the time. 56 Virtually all of those commenting supported the 
research enterprise, believing it necessary to make progress in the care 
and treatment of the mentally infirm.57 The differences among the 
comments focused on the e:dent to which research on this population 
should be regulated beyond existing DREW requirements for human 
subject research generally.58 
The view of researchers that additional regulation may be 
counterproductive was perhaps best e::-..'Pressed by Dr. Roger Meyer, of 
Harvard Medical School, who commented that ''the current 
environment is hostile toward needed research in biology and 
behavioral sciences."59 He and others also expressed the view that it 
was inappropriate to categorize all individuals with mental disabilities 
as unable to give consent; doing so, in fact, ran "counter to modem 
concepts of mental illness and to court decisions which have restored 
their civil rights and limited judgments ofincompetency.'1~9 
53Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,328 (Mar. 17, 1978). 
S4Id. 
55 See id. (summarizing the testimony offourteen individuals). 
56See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,352-55. 
59ld. at 11,352. 
60Id. 
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Among advocates for the mentally infirm, the statement by the 
American Bar Association's (ABA) Commission on the Mentally 
Disabled was the most detailed.61 While the ABA's Commission 
generally supported the practice of research with this population, it 
asserted that "experimentation" on this group should only be permitted 
when, among other criteria, "the research poses no more than minimal 
risk."62 The ABA Commission further argued that nontherapeutic 
research should not be performed over the objection of any subject, no 
matter how the objection is expressed.63 Therapeutic research should 
only be carried out on those institutionalized as mentally infirm under 
these criteria, with two exceptions.64 More than minimal risk research 
could be performed if "absolutely necessary to preserve the life, health 
or physical safety ofthe research subject" and if there was evidence of 
a "high level of therapeutic justification, the objections of [the subject] 
could be overridden with proper third-party consent and review 
61See id. 
62/d. The ABA Commission advocated the following prerequisites: 
(1) The protocol has scientific merit, verified by an independent 
multidisciplinary committee; 
(2) medical care, direct care and other institutional services are 
sufficient; 
(3) the experimentation will not reduce the amount or quality of therapy 
available to research subjects or to other residents; 
(4) the research poses no more than minimal risk; 
(5) the research is related to mental disability and seeks information that 
cannot be obtained from other subject groups; and 
(6) the information sought is of significance for the advancement of 
acknowledged scientific or medical goals. 
/d. at 11,353. 
63See Protection ofHuman Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,353. 
64See id. 
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procedures."65 Furthermore, the term ''therapeutic" was to be strictly 
defined "in terms of individual necessity and benefits."~5 
Of all the advocacy groups, Stewart Brown, representing the 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens, took a position that 
was perhaps most protective of potential subjects.67 He argued that 
those conducting research on this population should be "qualified and 
licensed" and that a "regulatory-type agency should enforce regulations 
and impose sanctions where violations [were] discovered."63 
On March 17, 1978, DHEW published Notice of the National 
Commission's Report and Recommendations on Research Involving 
Those Institutionalized As Mentally In.firm69 and asked for public 
comments before May 16, 1978.70 In the Report, the Commission 
recommended that research involving those institutionalized as 
mentally infirm be conducted or supported only when "an Institutional 
Review Board"71 reviewed the research design, the qualifications of the 
research investigator, and the adequacy of pre-clinical studies.72 With 
respect to the rights and welfare of human subjects., the IRB was to 
determine that: 
65/d. 
65/d. 
67 /d. at 11,355. 
63See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,355. 
6~e Commission retained the tenn "mentally infinn" because this tcnn was U£cd in the 
1974 National Research Act The Commission acknowledged, however, the comments 
received on DHEW's November 16, 1973, proposed policy stating that the tcnn should not b~ 
used. See id. at 11,329. 
70See id. 
71See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 474(a), 88 Stat 342 (1974) (st.nting 
that "[t]he Secretary [of HEW] shall by regulation require that ~ch entity which applies for a 
grant or contract under this Act for any project or program which involves the conduct of 
biomedical or behavioral research involving human subjects submit in or with its application 
for such grant or contract assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that it has established (in 
accordance with regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe) a board (to b~ kno\m as nn 
'Institutional Review Board') to review biomedical and behavioral research involving humnn 
subjects conducted at or sponsored by such entity in order to protect the rights of the humnn 
subjects of such research.") 
72See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,328, 11,330. 
73Jd. 
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• there are good reasons to involve institutionalized 
persons in the conduct of the research; 
• risk of harm or discomfort is minimized by using the 
safest procedures consistent with sound research 
design and by using procedures performed by 
diagnostic or treatment purposes whenever possible; 
• adequate provisions [have been] made to protect the 
privacy of the subjects and to maintain 
confidentiality of data; 
• selection of subjects among those institutionalized as 
mentally infirm will be equitable; [and] 
• adequate provisions [have been] made to assure that 
no prospective subject will be approached to 
participate in the research unless a person who is 
responsible for the health care of the subject has 
determined that the invitation to participate in the 
research and such participation itself will not 
interfere with the health care of the subject.73 
Of particular concern to the Commission was that individuals 
institutionalized as mentally infirm not be included in research studies 
where it was possible to obtain the same information from 
noninstitutionalized individuals.74 The IRB, then, was to consider 
whether the research being proposed would be "exploitive" of the 
institutionalized population by assessing whether the research would be 
13/d. 
14See id. at 11,331. Under contract with the Commission, the Survey Research Center at 
the University of Michigan (SRC) examined research being conducted around the country with 
individuals institutionalized as mentally infirm. The SRC report was based on a sample of 
studies reviewed by IRBs at 61 institutions. Research on this population constituted 9 percent 
of the research reviewed by these IRBs. In terms of subject selection, the SRC found that In 
"13% of projects involving the mentally infirm, the investigator did not mention the mental 
condition of the subjects as a factor in subject selection." The Commission speculated that it 
was possible that these studies could have been conducted on other populations and may have 
been conducted on this population as a means of convenience. Id. at 11,341. 
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"'relevant to the subjects' emotional or cognitive disability, whether 
individuals with the same disability [would be] reasonably accessible to 
the investigator outside the institutional setting, and whether the 
research [was] designed to study the nature of the institutional process 
or the effect of some aspect of institutionalization on persons with a 
particular disability."75 Concerning selection of subjects within the 
institution, the Commission recommended that subjects be selected so 
that "any burdens of research do not fall disproportionately on those 
who are least able to make decisions regarding participation in 
research."76 The Commission also addressed the situation in which a 
potential subject's physician or therapist was involved in the proposed 
research. 77 In those situations, in order to avoid conflicts of interest, the 
Commission recommended that "independent clinical judgment" be 
obtained to determine the appropriateness of including a patient in the 
proposed research.78 
The Commission's report included an influential analysis of the 
relationship among the risk-benefit profile of the research, subject 
assent, and third-party consent79 If the research in question involved 
no more than minimal rislt0 and the subject was incapable of 
75 !d. at 11,331. 
76/d. . 
77Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,331-32. 
18/d. The SRC report, done for the Commission, found that in approximately 25 p~rcent 
of the research with the mentally infirm, investigotors enrolled their o\\n p:~tients. See id. at 
11,341. 
77he SRC study investigators found that written consent was sought in more tlmn SO 
percent of the research they reviewed involving the mentally infirm. Third-p:nty consent was 
obtained in approximately one third of these cases. Third-p:nty consent was most frequently 
obtained in research involving the mentally rebrded Wld was obtained from the subject's 
parents, other relatives, or legal guardians. See id. at 11,342. When interviewed, "most 
investigators reported that third party consent served to protect subjects "very well" or "fairly 
well," but almost one-fifth of the investigators indicated otherwise. R~ons given included 
the third party's not being able to understWld the research or not caring about protecting the 
subject's rights. !d. 
8£Minimal risk was defined by the Commission to mean the "risk (prob:~bility Wld 
magnitude of physical or psychological harm or discomfort) that is normally encountered in 
the daily lives, or in the routine medical or psychological ex:unination, of normal persons." !d. 
at 11,332. For subjects institutionalized as mentally infirm, the Commission elaborated that 
"routine examination procedures present no more thWl minimal risk if the likely imp:~ct of such 
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consenting, the Commission stated that the research must be "relevant 
to the subject's condition."81 In addition, the Commission 
recommended that the subject "assent"32 or, at least not object to 
participation.83 If the subject did object, the subject could not 
participate in the research unless authorized to do so by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 84 In such cases, the Commission recommended 
that this authorization not be sought unless the research included an 
intervention or monitoring procedure that would be of direct benefit to 
the subject.85 In addition, "where appropriate," the Commission 
recommended that the IRB appoint "a consent auditor" to "observe the 
consent process and determine ... whether each prospective subject 
consents, or being incapable of consenting, assents or objects to 
participation in the research."86 
procedures on them is similar to what would be experienced by normal persons undergoing the 
procedures." !d. On the other hand, the Commission Report stated that an: 
!d. 
81/d. 
IRB may determine that prospective subjects who are institutionalized 
as mentally infirm are likely to react more severely than normal persons 
to certain routine procedures; in such instances, the procedures present 
more than minimal risk to the subjects.... For each research protocol, 
the IRB must determine the degree of risk that would be presented to 
normal persons and then consider whether such risk is heightened by 
the illness or institutionalization of the prospective subjects or class of 
subjects. 
82The Commission used the term assent to "describe authorization by a person whose 
capacity to understand and judge is somewhat impaired by illness or institutionalization, but 
who remains functional." Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,332. It further 
explained the standard as requiring "that the subject know what procedures will be performed 
in the research, choose freely to undergo those procedures, communicate this choice 
unambiguously, and be aware that subjects may withdraw from participation." ld. The 
standard was "intended to require a lesser degree of comprehension by the subject than would 
generally support informed consent." !d. 
83See id. 
84See id. 
85See id. 
86/d. 
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If the research under consideration involved greater than minimal 
risk, the Commission recommended that the research not be performed 
on this population unless it included an intervention that held out the 
prospect of direct benefit' to the subject or included a monitoring 
procedure "necessary to maintain the well-being of those subjects."23 
1bis risk would be acceptable if "all available treatments for a serious 
condition [had] been tried without success, and the remaining option 
[was] a new intervention under investigation.'@ If the subject was 
incapable of consenting, the Commission recommended that the subject 
assent to participation.90 If the subject was incapable of assenting but 
did not object to participation, the Commission stated that the 
permission of a guardian or court should be obtained.91 If, however, the 
subject objected to participation in the research, his or her participation 
could only be authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and only 
if the prospective benefit could not be obtained other than by 
participating in the research.92 For this type of research, the 
Commission recommended that an IRB determine the need to appoint 
an auditor "to observe and assure the adequacy of the consent 
process ... "93 and if there was a "substantial question about the ability of 
the subjects to assent or there [was] a significant degree of risk 
involved in the research, the appointment of a consent auditor by the 
IRB would be appropriate."94 
81See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,332. The Commission 
described a direct benefit as one that held out the possibility of fairly immediate bzmcfiL /d. at 
11,333. 
88See id. at 11,333. 
89/d. 
90See id. at 11,332. 
91See id. 
92Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,332. An C."iillllple of this typ~ of 
situation, according to the Commission, would be where a new drug is being tc:tcd by the 
FDA for effectiveness and its use is not pennitted outside of the drug trial. Sea i!L at 11,333. 
93/d. The auditor was not to be involved "(except in the cap:J.city of com:ent auditor) 
with the research for which subjects [were] being sought" In addition, the auditor was to b~ a 
person "familiar with the physical, psychological and social needs of the cl<L<:S of prospective 
subjects, as well as their legal status." /d. 
94/d. 
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The Commission also addressed research that posed greater than a 
minimal risk with no possibility of direct benefit to the subject 
population.95 Under these circumstances, the research could be 
conducted only if the anticipated risk of participation in the research 
was a "minor increase over minimal risk,"96 the knowledge expected 
from the research was "of vital importance for the understanding or 
amelioration of the type of disorder or condition of the subjects" or 
could "reasonably be expected to benefit the subjects in the future."97 
Regarding participation of subjects incapable of giving consent, 
participation would be permissible if the subject assented to 
participation.98 If the subject was incapable of assenting but did not 
object to participation, the subject could participate only with the 
consent of a legally appointed guardian.99 If the subject objected to 
participation, he or she could not participate in the research.10° For this 
level of risk, the Commission recommended the mandatory 
appointment of a consent auditor by the IRB to observe the consent 
process and "determine whether each subject consents, or is incapable 
of consenting and assents, or objects to participation."101 
95See id. at 11,334. 
96/d. at 11,333. 
97Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,333. Such benefit could be remote 
to the subjects, "such as the eventual development of better treatment for their condition." !d. 
at 11,334. As the Commission wrote in its later Belmont Report: 
Some populations, especially institutionalized ones, are nlready 
burdened in many ways by their infirmities and environments. When 
research is proposed that involves risks and does not include a 
therapeutic component, other less burdened classes of persons should be 
called upon first to accept these risks of research, except where the 
research is directly related to the specific conditions of the class 
involved. 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR TilE PROTEcnON OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, THE BELMONT REPoRT: EnnCAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR TilE 
PRoTEcnON OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF REsEARCH 19 (1978) (emphasis added). 
98See Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,334. 
99See id. 
100See id. 
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This recommendation was particularly controversial even among 
Commission members.102 One commissioner, in fact, submitted a 
dissenting statement focusing on this recommendation, in which he 
argued as follows: 
Since it is accepted that normal persons should not be 
enrolled in nontherapeutic research with more than minimal 
risk unless they can give informed and meaningful consent, it 
is doubly unreasonable that the institutionalized mentally 
infirm should be so enrolled when society has had so much 
recent concern for their greater protection, and when they 
live in environments which seriously discourage any kind of 
decision making and the nature of their illnesses weakens 
their abilities to choose responsibly in most of life's usual 
situations.103 
Lastly, the Commission addressed research that involved greater 
than a minor increase above minimal risk and did not hold out the 
prospect of direct benefit to the subject.104 Under these circumstances, 
the research could only be performed if: 
(II) The research present[ ed] an opportunity to understand, 
prevent or alleviate a serious problem affecting the health or 
welfare of persons institutionalized as mentally infirm; and 
(B) A national ethical advisory board and, following 
opportunity for public review and comment, the head of the 
responsible Federal department or agency have determined 
that: 
(I) The conduct of the research will be in accord with the 
101/d. In all cases, the consent auditor was to be independent of the research team. See 
id. at 11,357. 
102/d. 
103Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 11,358 (Robert E. Cooke, 
Commissioner, dissenting). 
104See id. at 11,334. 
HeinOnline -- 3 Depaul J. Health Care L. 566 1999-2000
566 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTII CARE LAW [Vol. 3:547 
basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of 
research involving human subjects; and 
(II) adequate provisions are made for obtaining consent or 
assent of each subject or permission from a guardian of the 
person.105 
The Commission stated explicitly that "because of the importance of 
the ethical issues at stake, debate [on this type of research] should be in 
a public forum, and conduct of the research should be delayed pending 
Congressional notification and a reasonable opportunity for Congress to 
take action regarding the proposed research."106 
Revisions by the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare 
On November 17, 1978, eight months after the Commission's Report 
was printed in the Federal Register, DHEW issued its proposed rules on 
Research Involving Those Institutionalized as Mentally Disabled.107 
The proposed rules took into consideration the more than one hundred 
comments received on the Commission's report.108 While the proposed 
rules "in essence" accepted the Commission's recommendations, they 
did depart from the Commission in some significant ways.109 For 
example, the proposed rules included a statement that DHEW was 
considering a requirement that consent auditors be appointed for all 
research with this population (even minimal risk research) and that an 
independent advocate be appointed for each research subject.110 
tosld. 
106Jd. 
107Protection ofHuman Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,950, 53,950 (1978) (to be codified at 
45 C.P.R. pt. 46) (proposed Nov. 17, 1978). DHEW fonnally rejected the tenn "mentally 
infinn" and adopted the tenn "mentally disabled" in large part as a result of comments received 
on their November 16, 1974 proposed policy." !d. 
108See id. 
109See id. 
110See id. at 53,952. An advocate was defined to mean an individual appointed by the 
IRB to act "in the best interests of the subject'' and who would be "construed to carry the 
fiduciary responsibilities of a guardian ad litem" toward the subject. This individual could not 
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For subjects determined capable of assenting but not consenting, 
DHEW also stated that it was considering whether to: 1) follow the 
Commission's recommendation to allow the subjects' participation if 
their guardians or legally authorized representatives (LAR), as DHEW 
termed them, m consented, or 2) require additional protections 
including the "consent of ... the Secretary, based upon the advice of an 
expert panel, or ... an advocate."112 Also, with regard to subjects 
incapable of assenting, the Department stated that it was considering 
whether to: 
(I) [b]ar their involvement in such research (on the 
assumption that needed research could be done using other 
subjects); 
(2) adopt the Commission's recommendation, which 
would permit their participation if they do not object and 
the legally authorized representative and a court of 
competent jurisdiction give their approval; 
(3) require, in addition to the approval of the legally 
authorized representative and the court, approval by the 
Secretary; or 
(4) require, in addition to that of the representative and the 
court, approval by an advocate.113 
These rules were clearly more protective of research subjects 
institutionalized as mentally disabled than those proposed by the 
have any financial interest in the institution conducting or sponsoring the research. Moreover, 
an advocate was to be familiar with "the physical, psychological, and social needs and the legal 
status of the class of individuals institutionalized as mentally diS3bled in the institution in 
which the research is conducted." /d. at 53,955. 
111The term "legally authorized representative" was substituted by DHEW for the term 
"guardian" by the Commission "since the latter [it said] is normally associated ''•ith p~rsons 
having responsibility for minors, while these regulations apply both to adults and minors 
institutionalized as mentally disabled." /d. at 53,952. 
112Protection of Human Subjects, 43 Fed. Reg. at 53,952. 
113/d. 
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Commission. They were also the subject of considerable controversy. 
In fact, the proposed rules were ultimately rejected primarily because of 
comments from researchers that they would prevent needed research.114 
According to AI Jonsen, a former member of the National Commission 
and prominent bioethicist, "officials at the National Institute of Mental 
Health (NIMH) and the Agency for Drug Addiction and Mental Health 
Association, objected that the recommendations would stifle important 
research with their populations."m Groups like the Association of 
American Medical Colleges also found the proposed regulations overly 
burdensome, commenting that the requirements of consent auditor, 
patient advocate, and appointment of a guardian were "ponderous 
mechanisms of no demonstrated value."116 
Twice in the next several years, the President's Commission for 
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research urged the Department to take up this issue 
again.117 However, according to at least one source, the Department 
"declined to do so, reportedly due to a lack of consensus on the need for 
them as well as the alleged adequacy of existing regulations."118 
114Although these proposed rules were never adopted, DHEW did adopt rules for 
research on other vulnerable populations including prisoners, pregnant women and fetuses and 
children. See 45 C.F.R § 46.205 (2000) (providing for "additional protections pertaining to 
research, development, and related activities involving fetuses, pregnant women, and human in 
vitro fertilization"). 
115See Jonathan Moreno, supra note 4, at 13. 
11~etter from John A. D. Cooper, M.D., Presid<Jnt of AAMC, to Honorable Joseph A. 
Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Jan. 16, 1979) (on file with the 
authors). 
117See Clarence J. Sundram, In Harm's Way: Research Subjects Who Arc Dccisional/y 
Impaired, 1 J. HEAL1HCAREL. & POL'Y 36,45 (1998). 
118/d. (citing Robert J. Levine, Proposed Regulations for Research Involving Those 
Institutionalized as Mentally Infirm: A Consideration Of Their Relevance in 1996, IRB, Sept.• 
Oct 1996, at 1). 
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SOCIETAL TRENDS INFLUENCING THE NATURE OF 
POTENTIAL REGULATION: 
FROM THE 1970s TO THE 1990s 
569 
Between the late 1970s and late 1990s, there were no new significant 
efforts to regulate research with the decisionally impaired population. 
Yet, during that time a number of significant societal, legal and medical 
changes took place that profoundly influenced attitudes toward the care 
and treatment of the decisionally impaired and may have affected the 
more recent proposals to regulate research with the decisionally 
impaired as well as how different groups now view the need for 
regulation of research with this group. These developments, described 
b!;::low, provide the backdrop for analyzing the recent proposals for 
regulation and the political reaction to them. 
Deinstitutionalization 
In the first half of the 20th century, aggressive efforts at finding 
treatments and cures for mental illness were undertaken in institutional 
settings.119 Although psychoanalysis or talk therapy, based on the work 
of Sigmund Freud in the late 1800s, had become the cornerstone of 
psychiatric practice, other, more interventionist, techniques were also 
developed with mixed results.120 Electroconvulsive therapy, a way of 
producing seizures through the administration of electrical shocks, 
became widespread in the treatment of psychosis.121 While effective in 
some patients, electroconvulsive therapy often resulted in disconcerting 
side effects, such as memory loss.122 During the 1930s, a surgical 
procedure known as a lobotomy, in which the frontal lobes of the brain 
msee MICHAEL H. SToNE, HEALING 1HE MOO>: A HisTORY OF PS'iCHIA'l'R.Y FP..0~.1 
ANTIQUITY TO TilE PREsENT 139-174 {1997). 
120See id. 
121 See RALPH REISNER & CmusroPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW & nm l\1ENTAL H.E.:\Lni S'iSl'Eo1: 
CiviL AND CRIMINAL AsPECTS 870 (2nd ed. 1990). 
1Z2See Note, Regulation of Electroconvulsil'e Therapy, 15 MICH. L. REv. 363, 368 
(1976). 
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were removed, was shown to reduce aggressiveness in animals.123 A 
modified form of the procedure was performed on humans. 124 
While helping some of the mentally ill, these treatments were 
generally ineffective in the treatment of schizophrenia and the number 
of individuals in the country with the illness grew considerably .125 In 
1954, however, a breakthrough in treatment of schizophrenia came with 
the availability of a drug called chlorpromazine, 126 a tranquilizer. The 
new drug was able to sedate individuals without the systemic effects of 
other tranquilizers available at the time.127 Those who administered the 
drug to schizophrenic patients in mental institutions reported dramatic 
results.128 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number of other 
antipsychotic drugs came on the market.129 None were any more 
effective but they differed in terms of side effects and dosing 
requirements. 130 These "antipsychotics" became widely available and 
allowed many who had spent years in institutions to live in the 
community.131 
123See VICfORIA SHERROW, MENTAL ILLNEsS 45 (1996). 
124See id. at 46 (stating that "(b]y 1960, about fifty thousand lobotomies had been 
perfonned in America, most on patients labeled incurable. Lobotomies reduced violent 
behavior in some patients but did not restore nonnal functioning. Many were left in a 
vegetative state, with severe brain damage; others developed seizure disorders. About 5 
percent died.") 
125See id. ("In 1904, about two out of every one thousand Americans were diagnosed as 
schizophrenic. By 1955, that number had doubled"). 
126Chlorpromazine is also known by the trade name Thorazine. It was the first of the 
antipsychotics, which are sometimes referred to as neuroleptics or drugs that act on the nervous 
system. See MERRIAM WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 781 (10th ed. 1993) (a neuroleptic 
is "any of the powerful tranquilizers (as the phenothiazines) used especially to treat psychosis 
and believed to act by blocking dopamine nervous receptors ... "). 
121See RENE SPIEGEL, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 36-40 (3rd ed. 1996). 
See also Richard Mindham, Pharmacological Aspects of Mental Illness, in MENTAL ILLNESS: 
CHANGES AND 'TRENDS 206 -207 (Phillip Bean, ed., 1983). 
128See SPIEGEL, supra note 127, at 39- 40; see also Mindham, supra note 127, at 206. 
129See STONE, supra note 119, at 188. Examples of these early antipsychotics include 
haloperidol (Haldol) and thioridazine (Mellaril). See id. 
130See Mindham, supra note 127, at 207. 
131These drugs were specifically aimed at schizophrenia. While the drugs were 
effective, they all had significant side effects. Some of these side effects included "acute 
dysonia (muscle spasms) and akathisia (restlessness). !d. at 208. In addition, these agents 
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In 1955, the number of residents in mental hospitals was at its all 
time peak of 559,000.132 As the "introduction of neuroleptic drugs 
became widespread"133 and individuals could be treated as outpatients, 
a long-term decline in the number of residents in these institutions 
began.134 By 1970, the number of inpatients in these facilities was 
339,000.135 By 1978, the trend toward deinstitutiona1ization was well 
on its way.136 In 1989 the number of institutionalized individuals was 
approximately 100,000.137 
While the process of deinstitutionalization began in the 1950s, 
fostered by exposes of sometimes abysmal conditions133 and by the 
availability of major tranquilizers,139 certain events accelerated the 
deinstitutionalizaiton effort.140 The push for deinstitutiona1ization was 
part of the larger "community mental health movement" advocated by 
President John F. Kennedy.141 As part of this movement, "[p]oliticians, 
mental health professionals, and others spoke out on behalf of the 
mentally ill, challenging the long-standing stigma against them. The 
government took a more active role in promoting mental health and 
were thought to have a greater likelihood of producing a long-tcnn, irrevcmible neurological 
side effect known as tardive dyskinesia (uncontrollable muscle spasms}. Sea id. 
132See Richard W. White, Jr., Mental Patients' Rights Should Be Limited, in ?v1ENTAL 
IlLNEss: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 195, 199 (William Barbour cd., 1995). 
133/d. 
134See id. 
135See id. 
136See id. at 199-200. 
131See DAVID A. ROCHEFORT, FROM POORHOUSES TO HO~ffil.ESSNESS: POLIC'l JUW.YSIS 
AND MENTAL HEALTII CARE 219 (1993). 
138See id. In an illustrated expose of the problems of mcntnl health institutions in Lift 
magazine in 1946 entitled "Bedlam 1946," journalist Albert Maisel called these institutions "a 
shame and a disgrace." Id. at 672. Some reports revealed that p:dients were being used as 
guinea pigs to test improbable hypotheses about the causes of mentnl illnC'".>S. One physici!lll, 
Dr. Henry Cotton, removed the tonsils and teeth of many p:dients, to prevent the infections that 
he believed could cause mentnl illness. Other physicians, believing that extreme fevers might 
reduce mental illness, exposed patients intentionally to infectious diseases such os malaria and 
typhoid to bring on a high fever. SHERROW, supra note 123, at 60. 
139See STONE, supra note 119, at 203. 
140See Albert R Roberts & Linda Farris Kurtz, Historical Perspccti\·cs on the Car;: and 
Treatment of the Mentally 11114 J. SOCIOL. & SOCIAL WELFARE 75, 85 {1987). id. 
141See id. at 82-85. 
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making services available to more people throughout the country."142 
These activities included increased funding for the study of mental 
illness143 and a promise of increased federal support for the care of the 
mentally ill. 144 
A combination of aggressive litigation and federal financial 
support for individuals outside of institutions further accelerated the 
deinstitutionalization of mentally ill individuals.145 A 1972 law suit, 
Wyatt v. Stickney, 146 advanced the claim that involuntarily committed 
patients had a right to treatment.147 This treatment entailed, as one 
commentator opined, "staffing ratios and physical amenities so 
expensive that hospitals could not afford to meet them."148 As a result, 
while a few institutions did improve their conditions, many state mental 
hospitals began to discharge patients more rapidly in order to achieve 
improved staff-to-patient ratios.149 According to one author, in addition 
to other lawsuits, the availability of federal Supplemental Security 
142See SHERROW, supra note 123, at 55. This governmental interest in mental health was 
in large part a result of the military's experience during World War II. About 18 percent of 
draftees were rejected because of some type of mental illness. See id. at 56. Individuals who 
served in the war were also vulnerable to mental health problems due to the prolonged stress of 
military service. See id. 
143See id. at 57 (stating that, in 1946, Congress established the National Institute of 
Mental Health, which was to improve services for the treatment of mental health and conduct 
research on the causes of mental health problems). 
144See SHERRow, supra note 123, at 64. In 1955, Congress established the Joint 
Commission on Mental Illness and Health, which conducted the first "nationwide survey of 
mental illness in the United States." /d. at 64. In its 1960 report, the Commission made note of 
the disparity that had long existed in funding for mental health programs as compared to other 
medical problems and blamed the inequity "in part on unfair public perceptions of mental 
illness-for example, that it is often not recognized as illness and that the behavior of the 
mentally ill frightened and upset people." /d. In 1963, Congress passed the Mental Health 
Centers Act, which was to provide funds to communities to construct and staff community 
based mental health centers. See id. at 65. 
145See RALPH REisNER, LAW AND 1liE MENTAL REALm SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
AsPECTS 1041 (3d ed. 1999). 
146See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
147See id. at 373. 
148See White, supra note 132, at 198. 
149See id. at 199. 
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Insurance (SSI) m 1974 furthered the deinstitutionaliz1tion 
movement.150 
While many mentally ill patients were able to make the transition 
from institution to community successfully, residing in halfway houses 
or other supervised settings, others were not 151 Many, including the 
elderly with dementia, as well as those under siA1y years of age with 
chronic mental illness, went to nursing homes!52 Also, because most 
states did not provide adequate outpatient services for this group, many 
became homeless and received no care or treatment.m One might even 
describe them as having been socially abandoned.1S4 
This trend toward deinstitutionalization shifted the focus of 
regulation of research from the institutionalized mentally disabled to 
the broader population of individuals with decisional impairments. 
Autonomy and the Decisionally Impaired 
Other changes in the law and public policy reflect a movement from 
paternalism to autonomy, a recognition of the rights of the decisionally 
impaired to make their own decisions about a multitude of issues 
affecting their lives. ISS This paradigm shift has led, for example, to 
some individuals who suffer from mental illness themselves becoming 
150See id. See also ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUIH ABOUT 
DEINSTITUI10NALIZATION 98 (1990) (stating that in ''the first year SSI was available, state 
hospitals saw a nationwide decrease in population of 13.3 percent, the largest decrCJ.Se ever"). 
lSlSee JOHNSON, supra note 150, at 119. 
152See id. (quoting a 1977 U.S. General Accounting Ofticc (GAO) Report stating that 
nursing homes had become the "largest single place of care for the mentally ill of all ages"'}. 
153See id. at 181 (stating that after the institutions were closed, the mentally ill were to be 
given care in halfway houses or community centers, but officials and taxpayers never c:nne up 
with enough money). 
154See Michael Winerip, Bedlam in the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, Section 6 
(Magazine), at 42. See also Richard Jed Wyatt & Evan G. DeRenzo, Scicm:dess to Hom'1lcss, 
234 SCL 1309, 1309 (1986) (identifYing a societal failure to conduct the research ne.:.ess::uy to 
determine whether deinstitutionalization would, in fact, benefit the institutionalized). 
155See Arlene Mayerson, 1970's and Onward-The Civil Rights Perspective, in THE 
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CmzENS wrm: :MENTAL RETARDATION 105 (La\\TCnce A. Kane, Jr., ct al., 
eds., 1988). 
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more active participants in the debate about the regulation of research 
with this population. 156 
The Disability Rights Movement 
The disability rights movement, in particular, has had a profound effect 
on the care and treatment of those with cognitive and decisional 
impairments. 157 In The Legal Rights of Citizens with Mental 
Retardation, Arlene Mayerson states that 
[A] profound shift in disability policy occurred in the decade 
of the 1970's. Rising visibility and activism in the disability 
rights movement, as well as passage of the first broad cross-
disability piece of legislation, challenged traditional ideas 
about disability. The anthem of the disability rights 
movement became self-detennination-disabled people 
demanded control over their own affairs on every level, from 
governmental decision-making to personal care. They 
attacked the medical model as oppressive. Doctors, social 
workers and other professionals were no longer accepted as 
the primary spokespersons; instead, disabled people began to 
speak for themselves. 158 
As a result of the movement, disabled individuals established advocacy 
groups "to promote self-advocacy and independence."159 Groups such 
as "People First"160 emerged to enable individuals "with mental 
disabilities to gain a sense of power over their own lives, by developing 
means of self-help and support and establishing mental health and 
mental retardation services responsive to their needs."161 These groups 
156See Rick Weiss, Bioethics Group Divided over Research on Mentally Ill, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 16, 1998, atA6. 
157See Mayerson, supra note 155. 
158/d. 
159/d. 
160See What Is People First (visited Jan. 11, 2000) <http://www.open.org/-peoplel 
/whatis.htm> (describing People First as "developmentally disabled people joining together to 
learn how to speak for ourselves"). 
161ROBERT M. LEVY AND LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WlTII MENTAL 
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have undertaken noticeable efforts to influence legislative and 
regulatory policies regarding their care and treatment 162 
Tlze Law o1z Treatme11t Refusal 
Concurrently, courts began to change their views, questioning the 
"paternalistic" approach of institutions and recognizing the autonomy 
interests of patients.163 Prior to the 1970s, courts, for the most part, 
deferred to institutional authorities in the care, treatment, and custody 
of institutionalized mental patients.164 In 1972, with the federal court 
case of Wyatt v. Stickney,165 courts started to recognize some rights of 
institutionalized patients. While the court ruled that institutionalized 
mentally ill patients had "a right to be free from unnecessary or 
excessive medication," the court did not recognize their right to refuse 
medication.166 Yet, regarding research, the court stated, "[p ]atients 
shall have a right not to be subjected to eh.-perimental research without 
the eh.-press and informed consent of the patient if the patient is able to 
give such consent, and of his guardian or neh."t of kin, after opportunities 
DISABILITIES 5 (1996). According to one source, membership in st:J.tcwide sclf-:J.dvocacy 
groups for the mentally retarded has grown rapidly with over 1,000 such groups in c:-:istcnca 
today - a threefold increase from 1990. See THE STA'IE OF nm STATES IN DEVEI.Ol'ME:!ITAL 
DISABILITIES 13-14 (David Braddock et al. eds., 5th ed.l998). The National Allio.nca for the 
Mentally Til, a grassroots, self-help and family organization dedicated to improving the lives of 
people with severe mental illnesses, was founded in 1979. Sec National Alli'ancc for the 
Mentally lll (visited Jan. 2, 2000) <http://www.nruni.org/about/twentyrs.html>. 
162In the early 1990s over 800 self advocacy groups joined together to c5tablish a 
national organization called Self Advocates Becoming Empowered (SABE). The group has 
developed "an advocacy agenda calling for the phase-down and closure of nll st:J.te opzmted" 
institutions for the developmentally disabled in the U.S. THE STA'IE OF nm STi\lES IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES supra note 161, at 14. Sec also SABE USA's Online Directory 
(visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.sabeusa.org> (describing organization). 
163See Dennis E. Cichon, Tlte Right to "Just Say No:" A History and Analysis oftlza 
Right to Refose Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283, 286 (1992). 
164See id. This approach contrasted markedly with court decisions affirming the right of 
non-institutionalized individuals to make decisions about their care and trco.tment. While the 
requirement for informed consent, for example, was already adopted by the courts for most 
individuals, it was not required for individuals in mentnl hospitnls. See also Pi\UL S. 
APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REvOLUTION: 'MENTAL HEALlH LAW AliD m:E Lll'.ms OF CtwmE liS 
(1994) (discussing informed consent). 
165See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (r\1.D. Ala. 1972). 
165 /d. at 400. 
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for consultation with independent specialists and with legal 
counsel. ... "167 
In 1978 and 1979, federal district courts in New Jersey168 and 
Massachusetts169 issued opinions concluding that involuntarily 
committed mental patients had a legal right to refuse antipsychotic 
drugs.170 While courts have differed ·in their approaches to these cases 
and the rationale supporting their determination, most courts have now 
recognized a right to refuse medication and other therapies by 
institutionalized mental patients.171 
The Law on Civil Commitment 
The move away from paternalism and toward autonomy is further 
reflected in changes in civil commitment laws. Specifically, the basis 
for civil commitment shifted from the need to treat to the need to 
confine those deemed a danger to themselves or others.172 This policy 
shift was in large part the result of the holding in Lessard v. Schmidt, 173 
a 1972 federal court decision. In Lessard, a federal district court held 
that "the state must bear the burden of proving that there is an extreme 
167/d 
168See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D. N.J. 1979), stay granted by 481 F. Supp 
552 (D. N.J. 1979), vacated en bane, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 
U.S. 1 I 19 (1982), opinion on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en bane). 
169See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), ajf'd in part, rev 'din part, 
634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. 
110See Cichon, supra note 163, at 286. 
171See id (stating that courts have differed on the right's legal source and, in particular, 
on the procedural safeguards necessary to protect the right). Historically, state courts were 
quicker to recognize the right of a mentally ill patient to refuse medication than the federal 
courts. From 1980 to 1990, federal courts that addressed the issue, adopted a professionnl 
judgment standard under which "patients could not refuse medication unless the decision to 
administer drugs constituted a substantial departure from accepted judgment. pmctices or 
standards." William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process As a Source of 
Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 311ND. L. REv. 937, 939 (1998). Since 
1990, however, the Supreme Court has heard two cases involving a psychiatric patient's right 
to refuse medication while in prison or while pending trial. In these cases, the Court appears to 
have embraced a "broader reading of the right to refuse" treatment under the federal 
Constitution. Id at 940. 
172See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (B.D. Wis. 1972). 
173See id at 1078. 
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likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm 
. to himself or others."174 In addition to defining dangerousness 
narrowly, the Lessard court called for greater due process safeguards in 
the commitment process.175 These requirements included representa-
tion by counsel, adequate notice of charges justifying detention, 
attendance at the hearing, exclusion of hearsay evidence, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and a standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.176 
By the end of the 1970s, all states had commitment laws that 
resembled the substance of the Lessard decision.177 These statutes 
either restricted commitment to persons who were dangerous to 
themselves or others (defining dangerousness to include "grave 
disability'' as well), or were interpreted as already providing these 
requirements so as to remain constitutionally valid.178 These changes 
were not without controversy. According to some critics, these laws 
made it nearly impossible to commit patients involuntarily.m One 
author stated that "a patient must literally be slashing his wrists or 
brandishing a weapon before he can be held in a hospita1."1E9 
Opposition to this view stems in large part from a concern for civil 
liberties.181 Advocates for the mentally ill are sharply divided on the 
issue: "[w]hile parent advocacy groups want to change the rules on 
involuntary commitment, patient groups want to keep the policy strict," 
that is, continue to make it difficult to institutionalize the mentally ill 
against their ,vill.182 
174See id. at 1093. 
115See id. 
116Seeid. 
177 See APPELBAUM, supra note 164, at 28. 
118Seeid. 
179See Erica E. Goode, When Menta/Illness Hits Home, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Apr. 
24, 1989, at 54. 
180/d. 
181 See White, supra note 132, at 201. 
182Jd. In response, it appears, to concerns of parent advocacy groups, the restrictive 
standards of some states have been relaxed. Since the late 1970's, some states have e:-:p::mded 
their restrictions for commitment beyond the justification of an immediate likelihood of harm 
to self or others. See APPELBAUM, supra note 164, at 49. In 1979, a Washington State statute 
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The Law on Guardianship and Advance Care Planning 
Another example of the law's movement to afford those with decisional 
incapacities more autonomy involves the effort to limit the scope of 
state court guardianship orders!83 A 1976 Washington statute 
mandated that courts impose only such "specific limitations and 
disabilities on a disabled person to be placed under a limited 
guardianship as the court finds necessary for such person's protection 
and assistance."184 Under this standard, persons "institutionalized as 
mentally infirm ... retain the right to consent or refuse to consent to 
research absent specific evidence concerning inability to exercise that 
right."l8S 
The limited guardianship movement was largely supported by 
developments in thinking about decisional incapacity and its ties to 
functional ability}86 Capacity, it was recognized, was not an all or 
nothing issue, rather capacity is nuanced, with different levels of 
capacity required for different tasks. 187 While courts do not consistently 
write limited guardianship orders, a significant majority of "state 
legislatures have taken major strides in recognizing the need for and 
appropriateness of limited orders."188 
redefined grave disability to include "severe deterioration in routine functioning" of a person's 
physical and mental condition. WASH. REv. ConE ANN.§ 71.05.020(1) (1995). Also, a North 
Carolina statute broadened the definition of danger to self to include behavior that is grossly 
irrational, inappropriate, or a sign of severely impaired judgment, creating a presumption that 
patients cannot care for themselves. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2 (1995). In addition, several 
states have expanded their commitment criteria, facilitating hospitalization of certain classes of 
mentally ill persons. See APPELBAUM, supra note 164, at 49. These states are Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, Rhode Island, and Texas. See id. 
183See Sally Balch Hurme, Current Trends in Guardianship Reform, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. 
L. ISSUES 143, 145 {1995-1996). 
184Protection of Human Subjects, Research Involving Those Institutionalized As 
Mentally Infirm, Reports and Recommendations for Public Comment, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,327, 
11,348 (Mar. 17, 1978) {quoting WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§ 11.88.010 (2) (Supp. 1976)). 
ISS /d. 
186See Hurme, supra note 183, at 157-161. 
187See Peter V. Rabins, Issues Raised by Research Using Persons Suffering from 
Dementia Who Have Impaired Decisional Capacity, 1 J. HEALTH CAREL. & POL'Y 22, 23-25 
(1998). 
188See Sally Balch Hurme, Limited Guardianship: Its Implementation Is Long Overdue, 
28 CLEARINGHOUSE REviEw 660, 663 (1994). 
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Paralleling the adoption of "limited guardianship" provisions has 
been the establishment of guidelines for the execution of advance 
directives. Today, all states have statutory regulations regarding some 
type of advance directive (living wills189 and durable powers of attorney 
(DP A) for health care.)'90 These documents allow individuals, while 
competent, to express their wishes for medical treatment should they 
become decisionally incapacitated, especially concerning life-
prolonging medical treatment.191 While virtually all states had enacted 
living will laws by the early 1980s, practitioners (both physicians and 
health law attorneys) soon realized that there were significant 
limitations to the static nature of living wills, 192 and advocated, instead, 
that individuals execute a DPA in which they could name a trusted 
family member or friend to make medical treatment decisions on their 
behalf should they become incapacitated.193 In these documents, 
patients might also eh.-press their wishes for medical treatment 
according to a number of hypothetical medical scenarios.194 
18~iving wills are written expressions of an individual's wishes regarding receipt of 
medical treatment if they should become tenninally ill and medically incap:tcituto::d. Sec 
WILI.IAMJ. CURRANETAL., HEALmCARELAWANDEnncs 637 (5th ed. 1998). 
190 A recent survey of advance directive legislution of all fifty stutes o.nd the District of 
Columbia found that, as of July 1999, 48 stutes have living will stutute:>. Sea ABA 
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Health CariJ Surrogate Dr:cision-Ua.!ing 
Legislation (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http://www.abanetorglelderlylltcalth.html>. The 
exceptions are Massachusetts and l\1ichigan. Of these stutes, 16 have a combined udvo.nce 
directive statute merging DPA's for health care and living wills. Sec i(L These stutcs nrc 
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kentuc!.:y, Maine, Marylund. 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, und Virginia. All 50 
states and the District have some type of health care DPA statute. whether it be contained in a 
combined statute or only within a living will statute. Sea id. Eleven stutc:.; currently have 
special mental health advance directive stututes. These stutcs nrc Alas.lro, Hawaii, Idaho, 
illinois, l\1innesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Te.xas, Utlh, and Wyoming. &c id. 
191See NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIREC'IlVES AND nm PURSUIT OF DEA1H WliH 
DIGNUY23-24 (1993). 
192See id. at 35 (describing the statutory constraints contained in living-will type laws}. 
193See BARRY R. FuRRow ET. AL., REALm LAW 715 (1995) (stuting that "[i]n the early 
1990s, the durable power of attorney quickly became the preferred fonn ofadvunc~ directive"). 
194See Diane E. Hoffinann, Sheryl Itkin Zirnmennan & Cutherine J. Tompkins. The 
Dangers of Directives or False Security of Forms, 24 J. OF LAW, MED. & Ennes 5, 6 (1996). 
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Advance directives have also been developed as a tool for choice 
in psychiatric treatment and research participation. The Bazelon Center 
for Mental Health Law, for. example, offers a "Psychiatric Advance 
Directive" that allows for both the designation of a proxy and 
"instructions about hospitalization and alternatives to hospitalization, 
medications, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), emergency interventions 
(including seclusion, restraint and medication) and experimental studies 
or drug trials."195 Commentators have also analyzed the circumstances 
under which advance directives of this kind might be used.196 
Moreover, advance directives (specifically, DPA) have been used by 
subjects in dementia research at the Clinical Center of the National 
Institutes of Health197 and are included in the more recent proposals to 
regulate research with the decisionally impaired.193 
Proxy Decision Making 
At the same time that legislatures were passing laws authorizing the 
implementation of advance directives, in furtherance of the autonomy 
interest of people who wished to anticipate future periods of incapacity, 
it became clear that many individuals were disinclined to execute these 
documents.199 Other mechanisms were needed to allow for 
195See Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Inc., Psychiatric Advance 
Directive (visited January 10, 2000) <http://www.bazelon.org/advdir.html>. 
196See Patricia Backlar, Anticipatory Planning for Research Participants with 
Psychiatric Disorders Like Schizophrenia, 4 PSYCH., PuB. POL'Y & L. 829 (1998). 
197 See Alison Wichman, Protecting Vulnerable Research Subjects: Practical Reality of 
Institutional Review Board Review and Approval, 1 J. HEALTII CARE L. & PoL'Y 88, 95-97 
(1998). Advance directives for research purposes, however, have the same weaknesses as 
advance directives for clinical purposes. Instructional advance directives, in particular, often 
fail to provide useful guidance for clinical care. See, e.g., Joan M. Teno et al., Do Advance 
Directives Provide Instructions That Direct Care?, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 508 (1997); 
Joanne Lynn, Why I Don't Have a Living Will, 19 L., MED. & HEALTII CARE 101 ( 1991 ), With 
regard to proxy advance directives, the proxy's decisions may not correspond to what the 
individual would want done. See, e.g., Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., The Accuracy of Substituted 
Judgments inPatients with Terminal Diagnoses, 128 ANNALSOFINTERNALMED. 621 (1998); J. 
Suhl et al., The Myth of Substituted Judgment: Surrogate Decision Making Regarding Lifo 
Support Is Unreliable, 154 ARCIDVES OF INTERNAL MED. 90 {1994). 
198See infra note 242 and accompanying text. 
199See FuRRow, supra note 193 at 715. 
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decisionmaking regarding end-of-life care for individuals lacking 
decisional capacity. As a result, many states passed new laws or 
expanded existing surrogate consent laws200 allowing family members, 
and, in some cases, close friends of a patient, to make medical 
treatment decisions for an individual lacking decisional capacity.2J1 
By 1999, thirty-seven states had passed surrogate health care 
consent statutes.2°2 In many states devoid of such statutes, courts 
articulated approval of surrogate consent203 In both court decisions and 
statutes, the surrogate was expected to decide consistent with the 
patient's preferences and values (if known), or if not known, then 
consistent with what would be in the patient's best interest224 This 
movement was facilitated by a presumption that family members are 
trustworthy and are better able to make these types of decisions for 
patients than are the courts.205 This was particularly true in the area of 
end of life decisionmaking. While state legislatures and state courts 
recognized the authority of surrogates (agents and family members) to 
consent to an incapacitated person's receipt of medical treatment, for 
the most part they did not address consent to participation in 
research. 206 Yet, the legal recognition of family decisionmakers in the 
realm of clinical decisionmaking paved the way for families to have a 
voice in the research context. 
:u;1nese existing laws typically allowed a family member to consent to medical 
treatment for another but not to refuse life sustaining treatment. Sec; e.g., Mo. CODE Mm., 
HEAL1HGEN. I§ 20-107 (1993), repealed by Acts 1993, ch. 372, § 1 (effective Oct. 1, 1993}. 
201Typically, these surrogate consent statutes listed, in order of priority, who could make 
these various decisions, see, e.g., Virginia's Health Care Decisions Act, AI) guardian or 
committee; 2) patient's spouse; 3) adult child of patient; 4) parent of patient; 5) adult brolher or 
sister of patient; or 6) any olher relative of patient in descending order of blood relationship. 
VA. STAT.§ 54.1-2986 {A) {Michie 1998). 
'2JJ2See Health Care Srurogate Decision-Making Legislation (visited Jan. 11, 2000) 
<http://www.abanetorglelderlylhealth.html>. 
203See FuRRow, supra note 193, at 718. See also New York State Task Force on Life 
and the Law, WHEN 01HERs MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS Wmrour CAPAcnY 
(1992) 33-35 [hereinafter New York State Task Force]. 
204See New York State Task Force, supra, note 204 ut 35. 
205See id. at 51. 
206See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 125. 
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Advances in the Treatment and Diagnosis of 
Mental Illness and Diseases of the Brain 
Another historical factor shaping the current debate regarding the 
regulation of research with the decisionally impaired is the progress 
that has been made in the treatment and diagnosis of mental illness and 
diseases of the brain. Twenty-five years ago, when the Commission's 
recommendations were first published, there had not been long-term 
experience with antipsychotics and other drugs for the treatment of 
mental illness, and the psychiatric research and treatment community 
was somewhat divided between those advocating psychotherapy and 
those advocating pharmacotherapeutic agents.2°7 Today, drug therapy 
is the primary approach to treatment of individuals with serious 
psychiatric illness.208 There appears to be a consensus now that 
"[p ]sychoanalysis and its derivatives ... have not proved to be effective 
as primary treatment for serious psychiatric illness (e.g., schizophrenia 
and manic-depressive illness)."209 That view, along with the 
development of effective medications for the treatment of these 
disorders, "led to a quiet revolution within American psychiatry and a 
return to its medical roots."210 
While the development of psychotropic medications 
revolutionized psychiatry and led to deinstitutionalization in the 1970's, 
many of the most promising breakthroughs in drug treatment have been 
relatively recent.211 In the last decade a number of new drugs for the 
treatment of schizophrenia-including, risperidone, olanzipine and 
201See Sheldon H. Preskorn, Mental Disorders Are Medical Diseases, in MENTAL 
ILLNESS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 29 (William Barbour, ed. 1995). 
208See id. 
209/d. 
210 /d. This revised understanding about the methods of psychiatric care evolved "over a 
period from the late 1960s to the 1980s. During those years, psychiatry changed more 
fundamentally than did any other area of medicine." /d. at 34. 
211See E. Fuller Torrey, Mental Disorders are Medical Diseases, in MENTAL ILLNESS: 
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 264, 269 (William Barbour, ed. 1995). In the late 1970s and eighties 
there was a hiatus in new drug developments for treatment of mental illness. See id. The lack 
of developments in this area may have been due in part to the lack of research money given to 
NIMH. See id. According to one author, "by 1985 the federal government was spending the 
same amount of research money on schizophrenia as it was on tooth decay." /d. 
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quetiapine-all with many fewer side effects than the prior generation 
of drugs, were approved by the FDA.212 Newer drugs have also been 
recently developed for the treatment of depression.213 These 
medications, known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRis), 
are used more extensively than the older "tricyclics."214 The more 
common use of the SSRis has been attributed to "a less problematic 
side effect profile in these drugs, their lack of toxicity when taken in 
overdoses, and their ease of administration (once-a-day dosing)."215 In 
addition to these developments, the first two drugs for the treatment of 
Alzheimer's disease were approved by the FDA within the last few 
years_216 
'While drug developments have received attention, probably the 
most significant progress in psychiatric research during the past twenty 
years has been our heightened neuroscientific understanding of the 
brain.217 The development of magnetic resonance imaging (N1RI) and 
positron emission tomography (PET) scans have enabled scientists to 
actually observe the brain and have offered psychiatric researchers the 
212See Grayson Norquist & Steven E. Hyman, Advances in Understanding and Treating 
Mental Illness: lmpliations for Policy, HEAI.m AFF., Sept 1, 1999, at 38. These new drug~ .. 
referred to as "atypical antipsychotics" do not require weekly blood monitoring and are b::tter 
able to treat "the negative symptoms of schizophrenia such o.s withdrawal from social 
contacts." Id. at 38-39. They are also significantly more expensive than the older drugs they 
have begun to replace. See id. at 40. 
213See id. 
214See id. 
215See id. at 39. 
216See Donepezil (Aricept) Drug for Alzheimer's: Use, Side Effects, Interactions (visited 
Jan. 11, 2000) <http://www.virtualdrugstore.comfalzheimer/donepezil.html>. The first, 
Tacrine HCL (Cognex) was approved by the FDA and came on the market in 1993. The 
second, donepezil HCL (Aricept), was approved in 1996. These drugs are not a cure or 
complete treatment for Alzheimer's disease. but do delay the progression of the disease. 
Donepezil (Aricept) Drug for Alzheimer's: Use, Side Effects, Intcrations (visited Jan. 11, 2000} 
<http://www.virtualdrugstore.comfalzheimer/donepczil.html>. Sea also SU£3.11 Cruzan, FDA 
Announces Approval of TACRINE HYDROCHLORIDE (visited Jan. 11, 2000) 
<http://www.fdagovlbbsftopics!NEWSJNE\V00434.html> (announcing the Food and Drug 
Administration's approval oftacrine hydrochloride, the first drug approved sp.:cifically to treat 
symptoms of Alzheimer's disease). 
211See Decade oftlze Brain Home Page (Library ofCongra.ss) (visited Jan. 2, 2000) 
<http://www.lcweb.loc.govnoclbrain> ("In 1990, President Bush proclaimed the ninetic:; the 
decade of the brain"). 
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opportunity to test hypotheses that they were previously unable to 
test.218 
These gains in psychiatric research and treatment have occurred in 
large part because of the involvement of mentally ill individuals in that 
research. In the debate over current efforts to regulate this research, 
researchers believe such efforts may lead to sacrificing future gains in 
understanding and treating mental illnesses and brain disorders. 
REGULATORY POSSmaiTIES AND POLICY CAUTION: 
THE LATE 1990s AND BEYOND 
Recent Governmental Initiatives 
Against this background of prior regulatory failure and an increasingly 
complex legal and medical environment, the recent state and federal 
governmental initiatives to more stringently regulate research with the 
decisionally impaired, reflect a noteworthy insistence that the 
protection of these vulnerable subjects requires a renewed effort to find 
a policy solution.219 Within a six-month span in 1998, a Maryland 
working group, convened by the Maryland Attorney General, 
recommended state legislation on research involving "decisionally 
incapacitated subjects;"220 a New York advisory work group, convened 
by the New York Commissioner of Health, recommended regulations 
on research involving "protected classes," including adults who either 
lack or are likely to lose decisional capacity;221 and the NBAC, created 
by President Clinton in 1995, issued a lengthy report and policy 
218See Norquist & Hyman, supra note 212, at 36. 
219In addition to the three initiatives discussed in the text, the Nation'at Institutes of 
Health has developed what it terms "points to consider," which it has posted on its web site "to 
assist IRBs and clinical investigators in their effort to protect participants who are, or may be, 
or may become decisionally impaired." National Institutes of Health, Interim - Research 
Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent: Points to Consider (visited Dec. 
23, 1999) <http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm>. 
~YLANDREPoRT,supranote 1, at 1. 
221NEWYORKREPoRT, supra note 1, at 28-33. 
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recommendations on research involving "persons 'vith mental disorders 
that may affect decisionmaking capacity ."222 
Of these three initiatives, only New York's effort was the result of 
litigation. In T.D. v. New York State Office of Jo.fental Healtlz,223 
plaintiffs-consisting of patients involuntarily hospitalized at various 
New York State psychiatric facilities who had been adjudicated 
incapable of consenting to medical treatment-challenged regulations 
promulgated by the Office of Mental Health.224 The plaintiffs alleged 
that, under the regulations, they could be forced to participate in 
research without their consent225 The regulations were struck do\\'D. at 
the trial court level because they were not consistent with a state statute 
requiring the Commissioner of Health to consent to all research 
involving children and incompetent adults.226 
On appeal, the appellate court upheld the trial court decision, and 
further deemed the regulations invalid based on additional statutory, 
common law, and constitutional grounds.227 The appellate court 
decision raised concern among researchers nationwide who feared they 
might be prevented from conducting scientifically valuable research on 
the psychiatric population.228 However, New York's highest court, 
while upholding the lower court decisions, ruled that, in declaring the 
222NBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 2. 
wSee T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (Sup. Ct. 
1995) affd, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed, 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 
1997), leave to appeal granted, 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997), appeal dismissed 668 N.Y.S.2d. 
153 (N.Y. 1997). 
n 4See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. 
mseeid. 
n 6See id. at 1021. 
xrrsee T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 183. See also 
Hoffinann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 129 (noting that bJSed on the appellate court decision, 
residents in a New York state facility operated or licensed by the Office of Mental Hcclth who 
lack decision-making capacity [could] not be subjects in any (non federolly funded) rc:eJich 
determined to be ''non therapeutic" and to pose a greater th::m minimJl risk unl~3 the 
individual (prior to incapacity) gave "specific consent or designated a suitable surrogate from 
whom such consent" coulg be obtained). 
msee Hoffinann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 129. 
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regulations invalid on additional grounds, the appellate court had issued 
"an inappropriate advisory opinion."229 
As a result of the trial court's original ruling, however, a 
regulatory vacuum existed, and the Commissioner of Health could 
hardly fill it without first obtaining expert advice about the relevant 
ethical and policy issues.230 The other two efforts, however, were 
entirely discretionary. The Maryland Attorney General perceived a 
problem-a gap in both federal and state law concerning proxy consent 
for research participation-and sought to develop a consensus on how 
to address it.231 NBAC chose the issue of research involving 
decisionally impaired subjects as a topic for its first report on non-
genetic human subjects research.232 Thus, the Maryland and NBAC 
initiatives, in particular, suggest that at least some in the policy arena 
believe that the conduct of research with impaired-capacity subjects is a 
problem, not simply a condition. The distinction is important for the 
development of public policy-"[f]or a condition to be a problem, 
people must become convinced that something should be done to 
change it." 233 
A belief that something should be done, however, is but the first 
step and does not necessarily imply agreement about the nature of the 
remedial action. Among the three governmental initiatives, one finds 
broadly similar recommendations in a number of areas as well as areas 
of disagreement.234 All three initiatives adopted similar frameworks in 
229See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 668 N.Y.S.2d. 153, 154 (N.Y. 
1997). 
230See id. at 185 (noting that the Commissioner of Health would likely issue new 
regulations governing human subjects research in response to the court's invalidation of the 
regulations). 
231 See Hoffinann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 134. In light of uncertainty about the 
authority of agents and surrogates to consent to participation in research on behalf of 
decisionally impaired individuals, as well as the strong and differing views expressed by some 
researchers and advocates, the Maryland Attorney General's Offices established what was 
called a "Working Group" to begin a dialogue on the issue. Id. 
232See Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063, 52065 (1995) ("[As a] first 
priority" the NBAC was to assess the "protection of the rights and welfare of human research 
subjects"). 
233J. W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PuBLIC POLICIES 114 (1995). 
234Because it is a federal entity, NBAC addressed some matters-for example, 
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their regulatory approach. Research on this population was first divided 
into two categories: research affording the prospect of direct medical 
benefits to participants and research without this prospect 235 Research 
was also categorized according to level of risk.236 Although prm~-y 
decisionmakers are given authority to enroll those lacking capacity in 
research, more protections are required, and greater restrictions on 
proxy decisionmakers are imposed, if research has no prospect of direct 
medical benefit or poses more than minimal risk. 237 Many points 
emphasized are substantively similar to points emphasized in the earlier 
regulatory efforts by DHEW. These include: 
• Need for research with this population. Researchers 
should not recruit subjects with impaired capacity if the 
research could be done with other subjects.233 
• Justification of research design. Researchers should be 
expected to pay especially careful attention to the risk-
benefit profile of research involving these subjects.239 
• Informed consent. Individuals with psychiatric or other 
disorders potentially affecting their decision-making 
capacity are not, for that reason alone, disqualified 
from giving informed consent for research 
membership on an IRB by individuals who can represent the subject population-that were 
thought by Maryland and New York to be beyond the scope of a state effort. The omission of 
these matters from the Maryland and New York reports does not neccs~ly imply 
disagreement with NBAC. 
235See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 15, at 137-38. 
236See id. at 139. 
237See id. at 139-49 (discussing Working Group's consideration of five factual scenarios 
concerning research protocols with different levels of risk and potential benefits). 
238See NBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 10; NEW YORK REPoRT, supra note 1, at 30; 
MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 3, A8-A9. 
239SeeNBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 10; NEW YORK REPoRT, supra note 1, at 30-31; 
MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 3, A13-A16. 
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participation. Researchers should pay careful attention 
to capacity assessment.240 
• Assent and objection. Potential research subjects who 
are incapable of giving informed consent but who are 
capable of giving assent-that is, explicit, albeit not 
informed, permission-for research participation 
should be asked for assent. Individuals should not be 
compelled to participate in research over their 
objection. 241 
Newer provisions, not included in earlier regulatory drafts, but common 
to all three recent proposals include: 
• Advance planning for research. Individuals with 
present capacity who can anticipate future incapacity 
(for example, people with early Alzheimer's disease) 
should be able to express their wishes about future 
research participation. They should also be allowed to 
pick their own "legally authorized representatives." 
The exact effect of planning documents, however, was 
one area of disagreement among the three 
governmental efforts.242 
• Research involving the prospect of direct medical 
benefit or involving no greater than minimal risk. 
Family members or others who may authorize clinical 
care for an incapacitated patient should be permitted to 
authorize participation in these categories ofresearch.243 
240See NBAC REPoRT, supra note I, at 57-58; NEW YoRK REPoRT, supra note 1, nt 32; 
MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 3, A9-AI I. 
241See NBAC REPoRT, supra note I, at 57-58; NEW YoRK REPoRT, supra note I, nt 32; 
MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 3, A21-A23. 
242See NBAC REPoRT, supra note 2 I2, at 61; MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 210, nt 3. 
243See NBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 53-54. Earlier proposals for research with 
institutionalized individuals, including the National Commission Report, did not include 
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Areas of disagreement among the three proposals include: 
• Characterization of the subject population. To the 
dismay of many commentators, NBAC focused its 
analysis on "persons with mental disorders that may 
affect decisionmaking capacity."244 Maryland and New 
York considered that decisional incapacity itself, 
regardless of its clinical origin, was the key factor in 
identifying a class of vulnerable subjects.245 
• Independent capacity assessment. According to 
NBAC, when research involves greater than minimal 
risk, a professional who is independent of the research 
team should assess the potential subjects' capacity to 
consent, unless ''there are good reasons" for using a less 
formal procedure.246 Neither Maryland nor New York 
would mandate this kind of independent capacity 
assessment 247 
• Levels of risk and proxy authority. NBAC recognized 
589 
consent by a family member even at this level of risk. Patient ossent or lnck of objection was 
required. If a patient objected to participation, additional protections were required. Sea supra 
note 229 and accompanying text; ?vfARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 4; NEW YoRK RE:roR.T, 
supra note 1, at 26.27. 
244See NBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 2. NBAC acknowledged that "[p]ersons \'rith 
mental disorders are not .•• unique in being at risk for loss of decisionmaking cap:u::ity." NBAC 
REPoRT, supra note 1, at 5. NBAC explained rather cryptically that it "principally focu.sed its 
attention on those who may be primarily considered for re£carch protocols because it is their 
particular mental disorder that is being studied." /d. Taking NBAC to task for retaining its 
"mental disorders" focus despite vehement objections during the public comment period. one 
prominent psychiatrist accused NBAC of perpetuating "outmoded stereotypes." Robert 
Michels, Are Research Ethics Bad for Our Mental Health?, 340 NEW E~m. J. MED. 232. 1427-
30 (1999). 
245See MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 3; NEWYORKREPoRT, supra note 1, ut 2. 
245See NBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 58; This recommendation is similar to the 
"consent auditor" recommendation of the National Commission. Sec supra te:-.t m:comp:mying 
notes 86 and 94. 
247See l\1ARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 3; NEW YORK REPoRT, supra note 1, ut 30. 
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only two levels of risk, minimal and greater than 
minimal. In NBAC's view, when research presents 
greater than minimal risk and no prospect of direct 
medical benefit, a legally authorized representative 
should have authority to agree to research participation 
in an IRB-approved protocol only if the protocol were 
also approved by a special federal review panel. 248 This 
approach, in the view of many commentators, would 
present a formidable barrier to various types of research 
involving, most significantly, brain imaging procedures 
like MRI.249 These and similar procedures have been 
viewed as falling into an intermediate risk category, 
"minor increase over minimal risk."250 Both Maryland 
and New York retained this intermediate risk category. 
Maryland would allow only a relatively small subset of 
legally authorized representatives (proxies named in 
durable powers of attorney for health care) to agree to 
an incapacitated subject's participation in this kind of 
research. New York would allow a broader group of 
legally authorized representatives (family members 
acting as surrogates) to do so. 
Aftermath of the Initiatives-Policymakers' Caution 
Each of the three initiatives recommended policy action. NBAC 
recommended amendments to the federal regulations governing 
research on human subjects, the New York task force recommended 
new Health Department regulations, and the Maryland working group 
248See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 54. The NBAC envisioned that, after acquiring 
sufficient experience with protocol-by-protocol review, the federal panel would adopt 
guidelines enabling IRB approval of certain types of greater-than-minimal-risk research. Sec 
id. 
249See, e.g., Michels, supra note 244, at 1428 {"The NBAC considers the present system 
for evaluating a patient's capacity to consent to dangerous treatment inadequate even to assess 
the capacity to consent to MRI for research purposes"). 
25o.nis characterization of an intermediate level of risk is found in the Department of 
Health and Human Services regulations governing research with children. See 45 C.F.R. § 
46.406(a) (2000). 
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recommended enactment of a statute.251 However, none of the 
recommendations has been implemented thus far. 
Although the Secretary of Health and Human Services has taken 
NBAC's report under advisement, no regulatory action seems likely in 
the near future. Moreover, NBAC requested states "to confirm, by 
statute or court decision" that proxies for clinical purposes have 
authority to act as "legally authorized representatives" and that friends 
as well as relatives be able to serve in this capacity.2..~ NBAC also 
requested state legislatures to ensure that "persons who choose to plan 
for future research participation are entitled to choose" their research 
proxies.253 No state legislature has yet acted on these 
recommendations. 
Action pursuant to the New York recommendations has been 
delayed in part by the resignation of the former Commissioner of 
Health and appointment of a successor, who would naturally require 
time to familiarize herself with the issues. Action has also been 
delayed because the recommendations produced sharp criticism from 
both advocates and researchers.254 A series of articles that appeared in 
the New York Post on the task force recommendations in early 1999 
provide some insights into the politics of the situation.25s According to 
one article, John Cardinal O'Connor, "evoking Nazi Germany, 
warned ... that the recommendations were dangerous" and "[a]dvocates 
for the mentally ill vowed to go to court if necessary to block them."2S5 
A subsequent article stated that "hundreds of advocates for the mentally 
ill protested at the Capitol" against what they viewed as 
recommendations supporting "state-sponsored drug e:hlJeriments using 
251See NBAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 53; MARYLAND REPoRT, supra note 1, at 2; NEW 
YoRK REPORT, supra note 1, at 29. 
252See NBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 52. 
253See id. at 52-53. 
254See Gregg Birnbaum, Gov Says He's All Ears in Drog-Tcsli'ng Furor, N.Y. POST, Jun. 
20, 1999, at 12. 
255See infra notes 256-260. 
256See Gregg Birnbaum, O'Connor Boosts Drog-Test Protesters, N.Y. POST, Mar. 10, 
1999, at 12. 
HeinOnline -- 3 Depaul J. Health Care L. 592 1999-2000
592 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [Vol. 3:547 
vulnerable people as 'human guinea pigs. "'257 The article further 
recounted that Cardinal O'Connor, prior to a meeting on this issue with 
Governor Pataki, said that ''to allow experiments with some risk-and 
no benefit to the subject-on adults who are too ill to consent on their 
own ... could be a potentially horrifying thing."'258 
A short time later, an article appeared expressing the views of the 
research and medical community.259 The article described how many of 
the city's leading hospitals and medical schools were lobbying the state 
to relax the proposed regulations and that they had "warned the state 
Health Department that the regulations will stifle research and cause 
drug companies to divert their funding to states that have less red 
tape."260 
The Maryland Attorney General's effort to win passage of detailed 
regulatory legislation collapsed after a divisive legislative hearing.261 
On the one hand, a representative of the pharmaceutical manufacturers 
complained of the burdens that the proposal would place on 
researchers, and academic medical centers lamented the additional 
burden on IRBs.262 On the other hand, the Maryland Catholic 
Conference and various patient advocacy and disability rights groups 
attacked the proposal as opening the door to exploitation of vulnerable 
people. 263 The legislators, appalled by the length and complexity of the 
251/d. 
258/d. 
259Gregg Birnbaum, Hosps Fight for Freedom to Experiment, N.Y. PosT, Mar. 24, 1999, 
at20. 
WJ/d. 
261See GENERAL AsSEMBLY OF MARYLAND FINAL STATIJS REPORT OF PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION (1999 Session) (reporting that SB 307 was reported out unfavorably by the 
Judicial Proceedings Committee) [hereinafter GENERAL AsSEMBLY OF MARYLAND]. 
z62See testimony of the Phannaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in 
Opposition to Maryland Senale Bill 307 (March 8, 1999) (on file with the authors). Sec also 
testimony of David B. Mallot, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Associate Dean for 
Medical Education, University of Maryland, Baltimore (March 11, 1999) (on file with the 
authors). 
u3See testimony of The Maryland Catholic Conference on Senate Bill 307 Presented 
Thursday, March 11, 1999 by Richard J. Dowling; testimony of The Arc of Maryland in 
opposition to SB 307 (March 11, 1999); testimony of Jamey George (for MCIL Resources for 
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proposal and discomfited by the controversy, promptly voted to halt the 
bi11.264 
A More Complicated Context for Regulation 
Today, as compared to twenty years ago, the conte,..,'t in which the 
debate over regulation of research with the decisionally impaired takes 
place is a much more complex one, with strong and cogent voices on 
each side. Arguments for and against the need for this type of 
regulation push and pull policymakers in opposite directions and make 
significant regulatory change a slim possibility at present 
The PuUfor the Status Quo 
Today, arguments of the potential for great break1hroughs in research 
on psychiatric illnesses and diseases of the brain pull policy makers in 
the direction of opposing more stringent regulation of research in this 
area. With the relatively recent development of brain imagining 
techniques, researchers are hoping to find "biological indicators" for 
specific mental illnesses.265 In fact, "intensive efforts are under way to 
find such markers based on abnormalities found in brain structure or 
functioning for many mental disorders and on abnormalities in 
cognitive testing."266 
These recent developments bolster researchers' contentions that 
greater progress is imminent and regulations now will impede 
breakthroughs that may result not only in treatment of many forms of 
mental impairment but also in cures for these devastating illnesses.267 
Independent Living, Inc. in opposition to SB 307 (March 11, 1999); and Testiomy Regarding 
SB 307 by the Mazyland Legislative Lobby for Life, Inc. (March 11, 1999) (on file \\ith the 
authors). 
2M See GENERALAssamLY OF MARYLAND, supra note 261. 
265See Norquist & Hyman, supra note 212, at 36. 
'1.66/d. 
wSee Robert Pear, Inspector Warns of Hazards in Experimental Drug Tests, THE PLAm 
DEALER, May 30, 1998, at AS (stating that "[s]cientists are reporting explosive gro\\1h in 
promising new biomedical research, with hundreds of products being tested on tens of 
thousands of patients, including children and people with severe mental illnes~,.,). Sea also 
See also Weiss, supra note 156, atA6 (quoting David Shore of the National Institute of Mental 
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Some members of NBAC, in fact, argued that the NBAC proposals 
went too far and would, in all likelihood, stifle important and needed 
research. 268 
Another argument of those opposed to more regulation in research 
is that researchers and IRBs are already adopting many of the 
suggestions called for by the recent regulatory proposals. These critics 
argue that, although there has been no change in this area since 1973 on 
the federal level either legislatively or through regulation, some subtle 
but recognizable changes are being made. 
These changes are likely to be a response to the availability and 
visibility of the proposals by the prestigious NBAC and the states of 
Maryland and New York, but other factors may also be at play. For 
example, researchers may fear additional litigation such as the T.D. v. 
New York State Office of Mental Health case in New York, as well as 
the revitalized enforcement efforts of NIH's Office of Protection from 
Research Risks (OPRR) and the accompanying potential loss of 
research dollars.269 As one prominent psychiatric researcher, Dr. 
Health as saying,''[t]his is probably not the best time to put the brakes on .•. since the science is 
now progressing very fast and Congress has recently become generous with funds"). 
268See NBAC REPoRT, supra note I, at 85-86 (Bernard, Lo, dissenting) 
[T]he Commission's recommendations ... raise barriers to research that 
involves only small increases over minimal risks and is likely to result 
in important knowledge about the participant's disease. Hence, the 
recommendations will thwart a better understanding of the 
pathophysiology of the diseases that impair decisionmaking capacity, 
while providing little additional protection to vulnerable subjects. This 
is not the correct balance between protecting vulnerable persons and 
developing better treatments for patients with brain disorders. 
Id. See also Patricia Maldonado, Presidential Commission Makes Recommendations to Protect 
Mentally Ill, BosTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 1998, (reporting that, in a letter to the Commission, Dr. 
Robert W. Buchanan of the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, said "some of the 
commission's recommendations "reinforce concerns' among researchers that the commission is 
"antipsychiatric research"). 
269See, e.g., Jeffrey Brainard, U.S. Suspends Human-Subjects Research at Virginia 
Commonwealth U., CHRON. HIGH. Eo., Jan. 28, 2000, at A34; Jeffrey Brainard & D.W. Miller, 
Federal Regulators Suspend University Medical Studies in Pennsylvania and Alabama, 
CHR.oN. HIGH. Eo., Jan. 24, 2000; Jeffrey Brainard, Watchdog Agency Blocks New Human-
Research Projects at U. of Illinois at Chicago, CHRON. HIGH. Eo., Sept. 10, 1999, at A44; 
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William Carpenter, recently commented, "Although I believe much of 
the present public attention is ill-informed and unfair, the field has 
received a wake-up call." He outlined several suggestions for 
heightened subject protection that he said "have worked well" at his 
research facility.270 These included soliciting patient comment on 
proposed research and consent forms, including clinicians other than 
research investigators in the capacity assessment and informed consent 
process, conducting the informed consent process as a bona fide 
"educational procedure" with special efforts to overcome the 
''therapeutic misconception," and providing "educational and 
sensitivity-raising sessions in ethics for investigators and staff."271 
NIMH is also proposing the implementation of guidelines designed to 
provide additional protections for decisionally impaired research 
subjects.272 
Another example of incremental change in this area is direct 
involvement by patient volunteers and advocates in IRBs.273 The 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) has initiated a program 
to train and place NAMI members on IRBs across the country.274 With 
the first group of NAMI trainees almost fully placed, and the NAMI 
Program presented at a recent meeting of IRB members and 
administrators,275 NAMI is receiving requests for trainees and other 
advocacy groups are discussing training their members?76 
Paulette Walker Campbell, Government Suspends Most Human Research Projects at Duke U., 
CHRON. HIGH. Eo., May 13, 1999, at20. 
270See William T. Carpenter, Jr., The Challenge to Psychiatry as Society's Agant far 
Mental lllness Treatment and Research. 156 AM. J. PSYCH. 1307 (1999). 
271/d. at 1309-10. 
212See David Shore & Steven E. Hyman, An NIMH Commentary on thr:: NBAC Report, 
46 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 868, 1013-16 (1999). 
273 See NAMI Invests in Mental Health Research Subject Education, THE BLUE SHEEr, 
Nov. 11, 1998. 
274See id. 
275See id. 
216See id. 
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The Push for More Stringent Regulation 
On the other hand, the push for more stringent regulations gains 
momentum with every new account of research abuses of vulnerable 
persons depicted in the popular press.277 These have not been limited to 
research on the decisionally impaired but have included research with 
racial minorities, the terminally ill, and other patients. For example, 
only recently has the federal government unequivocally apologized for 
the Tuskegee Syphilis study.278 In addition, a 1995 federal report 
revealed ethical lapses in a number of studies involving radiation, 
including some in which decisionally impaired subjects were 
involved.279 
Recent press coverage has described questionable research 
practices across a wide spectrum including research with individuals 
who are mentally ill or have other decisional impairments.280 Some 
articles have focused on conflicts of interest, in which physicians 
pressure patients into enrolling in clinical trials so that the physicians 
may receive the enrollment fee paid by the drug company testing their 
product.281 Other articles have exposed physician researchers engaging 
in fraudulent reporting of data in order to satisfy drug sponsors.282 
These articles erode public trust in the research enterprise. 
Generally, articles discussing research on the mentally impaired 
have focused on a few controversial types of research. These include 
washout and challenge studies.283 Washout studies require that 
277See infra notes 278-82 and 293. 
278See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Regrets 'Clearly Racist' US. Study, N.Y. TIMES, May 
17, 1997, atA1, available in 1997 WL 17838570. 
279See Human Radiation Experiments: Roadmap to the Project: ACHRE Report (visited 
Jan. 17, 2000) <http:www.tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/report.html>. 
280See infra notes 29t-294. 
281See Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y. 
TIMEs, May t6, t999, at At (stating that SmithKiine Beecham P.L.C., was paying $1,610 for 
each patient that doctors signed up and that doctors can earn as much as $500,000 to $1 million 
a year for recruiting patients into clinical drug trials). 
282See Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, A Doctor's Drug Studies Turn into Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMEs, May t7, t997, at At (reporting on pmctices of Dr. Robert Fiddes who allegedly 
became rich by "conducting research fraud of audacious proportions, cutting comers and 
inventing data to keep the money flowing from the drug industry.") 
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individuals be taken off their medication for a period of time.284 In 
studies seeking an understanding of the physiology of mental illness, 
scans are then taken of the brain to observe the natural course of the 
disease and its impact on the brain. 285 Washout may also be necessary 
to make sure an individual is cleansed of one drug before a new drug is 
offered as part of a clinical trial.286 Challenge studies also require that 
individuals be taken off their medications.287 Research subjects are 
given drugs that exacerbate symptoms or induce psychosis.283 These 
"challenge agents" enable scientists to use the subjects as models for 
studying psychotic illnesses.289 
Articles in the lay press have focused on the risks inherent in these 
studies. In a number of cases, individuals were allegedly harmed and 
were not given informed consent prior to enrollment in the studies.:zrr3 
Reports that a schizophrenic patient who had participated in a washout 
study committed suicide in 1991 by jumping off the roof of a building 
at the University of California at Los Angeles291 were taken by critics as 
damning evidence of the risks associated with this type of research.2J'"2 
A series in the Boston Globe in November 1998 focused, in large part, 
on patients who were enrolled in washout and challenge studies without 
being told that they might experience relapses or be ex-posed to drugs 
283See infra note 293. 
~AC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 13-14. Sometimes these medication free periods are 
referred to as "drug holidays." /d. at 14. 
285See id. 
286See id. at 14 ("[S]uch a protocol often seeks to return the individual to a medication 
free baseline state so that behavior can be assessed or new drugs introduced without the 
confounding factor of other substances already in the person's system"). 
281Seeid. 
mseeid. 
28~AC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 13. 
290See infra notes 291-93. 
291See Philip J. Hilts, Agency Faults a UCLA Study for Suffering of Menial Palfents, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1994, at Al (reporting that the OPRR found that the experiment "failed 
to comply with the requirements ofH.H.S. regulations by not telling patients the extent of the 
risks they would be asked to take and not telling them that ordinacy treatment would be safer 
for most of them"). 
292See Editorial, When Menial Patients Are at Risk, N.Y. T!MES, Mar. 31, 1999, atA28. 
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that would exacerbate their symptoms. 293 An editorial appearing in the 
Globe on the heels of the series characterized the articles as presenting 
"an ethical wasteland where doctors not only cause anguishing 
psychotic symptoms in formerly functioning patients, but occasionally 
drive them to suicide."294 Individuals who bring forth this list of abuses 
argue that, while regulation of research with this population is 
necessary, the regulatory proposals do not go far enough. 
Researchers defend this type of research by arguing that the 
conditions being studied are uniquely human conditions and there are 
no animal models for developing treatment.295 Researchers further 
contend that the risks of these studies have been exaggerated and that 
adequate safeguards for subject welfare are in place.296 The goal of 
these studies, according to the NBAC, "is to generate disease 
manifestations in a controlled setting so that they can be more fully 
understood and so that appropriate interventions can be designed, 
attempted, and evaluated."297 Yet, the NBAC Report raised several 
questions about these studies including whether it is "possible to obtain 
informed consent to participate in a study designed to provoke symptoms'' 
and "whether the relationship between risks and potential benefits can ever 
justify enrolling individuals in such studies when the protocols include 
intentionally inducing what would otherwise be considered harmfu1."298 
Those arguing for more stringent regulations express skepticism about 
the ability of IRBs to protect research subjects. Rejecting arguments 
that self improvement by IRBs is sufficient without additional 
regulations, critics argue that there are deeper, more fundamental 
293See Robert Whitaker & Dolores Kong, Doing Harm: Research on The Mentally Ill, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15-18, 1998, at AI {four-part series). 
294See Editorial, Unethical Experimentation, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1998, at A26. 
295See Whitaker & Kong, supra note 293. 
296See William T. Carpenter & Robert R. Conley, Sense and Nonsense: An Essay on 
Schizophrenia Research Ethics, 35 ScmzOPHRENIAREsEARCH 219,222-23 (1999). 
291/d. See also Franklin G. Miller & Donald L. Rosenstein, Psychiatric Symptom· 
Provoking Studies: An Ethical Appraisal, 42 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 403 (1997) 
("Encouraging open discussion of potentially problematic psychiatric research coupled with 
refinement of research guidelines may obviate excessive regulatory restrictions that could 
hamper valuable research and its contribution to improved patient care"). 
298See NBAC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
HeinOnline -- 3 Depaul J. Health Care L. 599 1999-2000
2000] RESEARCH & DECISIONALLY IMPAIRED INDIVIDUALS 599 
problems with the IRB system that these modifications do not 
address?99 For example, a June 1998 report of the Department of 
Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General identified 
deficiencies in IRB oversight and concluded that IR.Bs are under 
considerable stress-faced with many more protocols for review than 
they can adequately handle.300 Others have criticized IRBs as being 
captives of the institutions over which they preside, heavily dominated 
by researchers and others motivated by the cash flow that comes to 
academic institutions from research grants,301 with only a token member 
from the community or representative of patient interests.302 
The Politics of Change-Alliances and Divergences 
Among Advocacy Groups for the 
Mentally ID and those with Dementia 
The complexity of regulating research in this area is further 
compounded by une}...'}Jected political alliances and rifts between 
advocacy groups that, in other circumstances, would be regarded as 
allies. New voices of patients, not heard twenty-five years ago; 
differences in perspective based upon disease category; and diverging 
interests between patients and family members have splintered 
stakeholders that might otherwise be unified in their approach to this 
issue.303 
299See Institutional Review Boards: A Time for Reform Bc!fora tlza Hause Resources 
Subcomm., House Government Reform and Oversight Comm., 10Sth Cong. (1998). 
300See Institutional Review Boards: A Time for Reform Bifore the Hause Resazucas 
Subcomm., House Government Reform and CA·ersight Comm., 10Sth Cong. 1 (1998); NAMI 
INvEsTs IN MENTAL HEALTII REsEARCH SUBJEcr EDUCATION, FnML REPoRT: EVIILUATIO~l OF 
NIH IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 491 OF TilE PUBUC HEALTII SERVICE ACT, l\WIDATR;G A 
PROGRAM OF PROTECTION FOR REsEARCH SUBJECTS 1 (1998}. 
301See Sunclram, supra note 117, at 49-50 (referring to the 1996 GAO Report which 
raised concerns about IRB "lack of independence, and collegial and institutional pressures 
upon IRB members that cloud their role as a safeguard on research procticcs"). 
302See Adil E. Shamoo & Joan L. O'Sullivan, The Ethics of Research on tha Mentally 
Disabled, in HEALTII CARE Enncs-CRmCAL ISSUES FOR TilE 21ST CammY 242 (J.F. 
Monagle & D.C. Thomasma, eds.,1998}. 
303See Weiss, supra note 156, at A6 (stating that regulating psychiatric research "hns 
even split the vociferous community of patient advocates, including the 185,000-mcmber 
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI). One camp perceives research ns the key to 
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Patient advocacy groups have been the strongest proponents of 
research with decisionally impaired, even research that requires the 
involvement of persons unable to provide their own informed consent 
Advocacy groups representing Alzheimer's disease patients have long 
been supporters of research, actively entering into partnership with 
researchers to assist in study advertisement and recruitment. 304 
Advocates for psychiatric patients, particularly NAMI, have also been 
strong supporters of research. 305 Yet many factors have contributed to 
differences of opinion between these two patient groups regarding the 
regulation of research with those lacking decisionmaking capacity, 
including differences in disease manifestation and sequelae. 
Specifically, Alzheimer's disease is a late-onset disorder.306 Although 
there are subsets of the disorder that present in middle life, the 
overwhelming majority of cases surface at the end of the life span.307 
Because of this fact, persons who suffer from Alzheimer's disease are 
likely to remain in the care of their extended families from whom they 
curing mental illness and wants to assure that new regulations are not unduly restrictive. The 
other camp sees its former colleagues as having sold out to wealthy pharmaceutical companies 
and private research enterprises, which in recent years have sought to integrate themselves into 
the patient advocacy movement''). 
304In 1982, the Alzheimer's Association initiated its own grants program and since then 
"has awarded $60 million in research funding." The Association "has a long commitment to 
the direct support of research grants as well as a commitment, through public policy efforts, to 
increase federal funding for Alzheimer's disease research. Sec Alzheimer's Association 
(visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.alz.org.>. See also Local Opportunities for Participation 
in Research (visited Jan. 24, 2000) <http://www.alzcmd.org> (Maryland Chapter of the 
Alzheimer's Association website listing local clinical trials and other research opportunities for 
Alzheimer's patients.) 
305See Senate Bill 307, Before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, (Mar. 11, 
1999) (testimony of Bill O'Brien, Chair of the NAMI Maryland Subcommittee on Research 
Ethics). See also Laurie M. Flynn & Ronald S. Honberg, Achieving Proper Balance In 
Research with Decisionally Impaired Subjects: NAMI's Perspective on the Worldng Group's 
Proposal, I J. HEALTII CAREL. & PoL'Y 174, fu 50 (1998) (describing NAMI standards 
established for the protection of research subjects). But see Weiss, supra note 303, at A6 
(describing the schism between members ofNAMI over this issue). 
306See Eleanor P. Lavretsky & Lissy F. Jarvik, Etiology and Pathogenesis of Alzheimer's 
Disease: Current Concepts, in ALzHEIMER's DISEASE: A HANDBOOK FOR CAREGIVERS 80 
(Ronald C. Hamdy et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) 
3m See id. ("The prevalence of dementia from all causes, ranges from 5% to 10% among 
persons age 65 and older and the rate increases exponentially as age advances"). 
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can draw much support and sympathy.303 In contrast, psychiatric illness 
tends to strike much earlier in life, leaving many persons with 
psychiatric illness unable to finish school, start or sustain careers, or 
establish their own families.309 Unlike Alzheimer's disease patients 
who have had a chance to contribute to society and raise a family, it is 
not uncommon for persons with psychiatric disease to have caused 
much burden and heartache for their families for many years.310 Much 
more so than in the Alzheimer's conte:-..1, a split exists between persons 
with mental illness and their family members regarding research on this 
population and how it should be regulated.311 As might be e:-..'Pected, 
relatives of individuals with a psychiatric disease are largely supportive 
of regulations that allow for family consent to participation in research 
of a patient lacking decisional capacity.312 Some individuals with 
mental illness, however, fear that they might, all too quickly, be tagged 
as decisionally impaired and enrolled, by a member of their family, in a 
clinical trial in which they would not wish to participate.313 The 
division is analogous to the debate over the laws for civil 
commitment-family members of the mentally ill would like to see the 
laws loosened to allow more flexibility in committing mentally ill 
308See Curtis B. Clark & Lynda Westerly, Elder Abusa, in AI..z:HmlER'S DISEASE: A 
HANBOOKFORCAREGIVERS, 329 (Ronald C. Hamdy etnl. eds., 2d cd. 1999). 
309See Laura Lee Hall & Laurie Flynn, Consumer and family concarns about r.::search 
involving human sribjects research, in Ennes IN PSYCHIAlRIC RE.sE.<\RCH 219-38 (Harold Alan 
Pincis et al. eds., 1999). 
310See id. 
311See id. 
312See id. 
313Amici in the T.D. case criticized the New York regulations on re:eo.rch \\ith 
institutionalized patients as allowing surrogates to consent to such p:uticipation \\ithout 
guidelines that require them to consider what the patient would have wanted or what would be 
in their best interest and argued that "without proper guidelines, surrogates may be influenced, 
however, subconsciously, by such improper considerations as the perception that the patient's 
continued care is dependent on participation in research, or desperation for n cure even when 
the research is non therapeutic." Brief for proposed Amici Curiae, The Bazclon Center for 
Mental Health Law, et al. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health. 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 
(App. Div. 1996)(No. 5136/91). See also Richard Ketai et nl., Family Influence in the 
Recruitment of Schizophrenic Research Subjects, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 351 (1981) (finding 
"striking manipulation" by family members to have their schizophrenic relatives p:uticip:J.te in 
high risk research). 
HeinOnline -- 3 Depaul J. Health Care L. 602 1999-2000
602 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [Vol. 3:547 
patients so that they can be treated; mentally ill patients prefer the 
narrow criteria of "dangerousness" to remain the commitment 
standard. 314 
Another difference in disease manifestation has contributed to 
differences in the political force of each of these groups. Alzheimer's 
disease is a disease of the modem age. It has only been in the twentieth 
century that persons have lived long enough to develop the disorder. 
Psychiatric disease, in contrast, has been observed and recorded 
throughout all of human history. These differences, in part, contribute 
to the differentials in social stigma associated with these diseases. 
Although we now know that the loss of our mental faculties in late life 
is not normal aging but a manifestation of brain disease, we still tend to 
feel more kindly to our elderly neighbor when we find him or her 
wandering, disoriented and confused, than we do towards the young 
schizophrenic who gets on the subway with us, talking to him or herself 
and gesticulating in the air. These differential emotional reactions-
pity versus fear, sympathy versus aversion-also contribute to 
differences in funding streams and reimbursement for care of persons 
with either of these conditions.315 
Thus, the sectors of support for research that, by the very nature of 
the questions it asks, involves persons decisionally unable to provide 
their own informed consent, have been composed mostly of physicianM 
investigators, patient family members, and the friends of science in the 
halls of the U.S. Congress and state legislatures. Those raising 
concerns about the vulnerability of these subjects, and thus the need for 
caution and increased protections, on the other hand, have been 
disability rights advocates, medical ethicists and former decisionallyM 
314See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
315See Winerip supra note 154, at 45-46. The differences in social support for these two 
kinds of conditions show themselves in how their care is paid for by our society. Sec id. 
Much of our tax dollars goes to taking care of persons with Alzheimer's disease. Sec id. 
These are the residents of our nation's nursing homes who are taken care of with Medicaid 
dollars. See id. According, however, to a 1998 study by The Bazelon Center for Mentnl 
Health Law, "[f) ewer than half of the Americans with schizophrenia receive adequate care" and 
"spending by the 50 states on treatment for the seriously mentally iii is a third Jess today than it 
was in the 1950s (once numbers are adjusted for inflation and population growth)." !d. 
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impaired subjects, themselves?16 The former is a political alliance of 
the strong and powerful. The latter is a political alliance of what 
traditionally has been the weak and fragmented. As a result of many of 
the societal, legal and medical changes that have taken place in the last 
twenty years-deinstitutionalization, the disability rights movement, 
increased rights of the disabled to refuse medical treatment and 
limitations on our ability to institutionalize them or appoint a guardian 
to make decisions for them, and the development of medications that 
allow many of those with mental illnesses to fi.lnction in the 
community-the voices of those with mental illness and disorders that 
affect the brain are now being heard. Yet, these voices are not speaking 
in unison and further complicate the future of regulatory initiatives. 
Longer Run Prospects-Working Toward the 
Opening of the Policy 'Vindow 
Given the history of controversy in this area and the sharply differing 
views of many participants in the debate, inaction on the three sets of 
recommendations to regulate research on the decisionally incapacitated 
is not surprising. This is especially true given the inability to reach 
consensus on the core ethical issue, that is, whether research that poses 
more than a minimal risk may be ethically conducted on persons who 
are both unable to give consent and unlikely to benefit from 
participation in the research. Indeed, the most likely short-term 
outcome is that the irreconcilable views of influential forces 
(researchers, academic institutions, pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
patient rights groups, family advocates, religious organizations) will 
lead policymakers to view inaction as the safest course.317 
Yet, policy inaction does not necessarily mean that progress on 
this issue will not continue. The very fact of three governmental 
initiatives, ratifying simultaneously the need for greater care when 
316See Wichman, supra note 197, at 93 (''Vulnerable research subjects are p::ople who 
are relatively or absolutely incapable of protecting their interests"). 
317In that event, advocates might pursue a litigation-oriented strategy, \\ith unpredictable 
consequences. If other courts were to accept the now-vacated opinion of the intermediate 
appellate court in T.D., policy change will be constitutionally compelled. Sea supra notes 223-
230, and accompanying text 
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capacity-impaired subjects are emolled in research, helps change the 
zeitgeist, the set of expectations that researchers and IRBs bring to the 
conduct and review of this type of research. The policy proposals, or 
publicity about them, may also have contributed to the phenomenon of 
improved self-regulation discussed above. Many psychiatric 
researchers, for example, will pay more attention than ever to capacity 
assessment and risk reduction. IRBs will continue to expand their 
membership to include those who can better represent the perspective 
of impaired-capacity subjects. Assent procedures will be made more 
explicit. None of these changes requires regulatory or legislative 
action. That they are incommensurable does not make them 
insubstantial. 
Moreover, the struggles over the NBAC, Maryland, and New York 
reports may be viewed as an essential, albeit often frustrating, part of 
policy development. Policy change occurs, according to the trenchant 
analysis of a leading political scientist, John W. Kingdon, when three 
"streams of processes" come together: "(1) problem recognition, (2) the 
formation and refining of policy proposals, and (3) politics."318 At 
certain times, "when a policy window opens," these three streams 
merge into action: "A problem is recognized, a solution is available, 
[and] the political climate makes the time right for change .... "319 
In other countries with significant biomedical research activities, 
the time has been right for change. In Canada, the Tri-Council 
Working Group completed and submitted its Code of Ethical Conduct 
for Research Involving Humans to the Medical Research Council of 
Canada (MRC), the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research 
Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).320 This Code includes several 
articles specifically limiting the conditions under which persons unable 
to provide their own informed consent can be entered into research. 321 
318See KINGDON, supra note 233, at 87. 
319/d. at 88. 
320See Canadian Tri-Council Report, Code of Conduct for Research Involving Humans, 
(visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http://www.ethics.ubc.ca/code>. 
321See id. 
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In Europe, the Council of Europe also issued convention articles 
explicitly limiting the involvement of persons in research unable to 
give their own voluntary consent322 
In the United States, the very existence of the three governmental 
initiatives, against a backdrop of extensive analysis and commentary in 
the academic literature,323 suggests that research with impaired-capacity 
subjects is now recognized as a problem. Still missing, as the reaction 
to the initiatives demonstrates, is anything approaching consensus 
about a solution. Thus, formal adoption of even modest regulatory 
proposals may still be far off. In Maryland, for example, the Attorney 
General recently proposed a drastically revised bill characterized by 
that office as "incrementally helpful'in protecting vulnerable subjects, 
not unduly burdensome to investigators or IRBs, focused on matters 
that even people who disagree sharply about other things might accept 
as common ground, and relatively short and uncomplicated."324 
Avoiding the most controversial areas in the bill rejected earlier in the 
year, the Attorney General's more recent proposal did not try to define 
"legally authorized representatives" or allocate authority by reference to 
risk categories. Nor did it address research advance directives. In that 
respect, the proposal maintained the status quo. In essence, the 
proposal merely sought to remind investigators and IRBs that they 
322See Council of Europe Report. Com·ention for the Protection of Human Riglzls and 
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (visited Jan. 20, 2000) 
<http://www.coe.fr/engllegaltext/164e.htm>. 
323See, e.g., Philip M. Bein, Surrogate Consent and the Incompetent Experimental 
Subject, 46 FOOD DRUG CoSMETIC L.J. 739 (1991); Jessica Wilen Berg, ugal and Ethical 
Complexities of Consent with Cognitively Impaired Research Subjects: Proposed Guid21ines, 
24 J. LAW, 1-.f:ED & Ennes 18 (1996); Richard J. Bonnie, Research with Cogniti~·ely Impaircd 
Subjects, 54 ARCH. OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 105 (1997); Evan DeRenzo, Surrogate Decision 
Making for Severely Cognitivley Impaired Research Subjects: The Continuing D<Jbate 3 
CM.mRIDGEQ. OFHEALTIICAREE'IHICS 539 (1994); Evan G. DeRenzo, The Elhic.s ofim·oMng 
Psychiatrically Impaired Persons in Research, IRB, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 7; Rebecca Drcscr, 
Mentally Disabled Research Subjects: The Enduring Policy Issues, 276 JAMA 67 (1996); Joson 
H.T. Karlawish & Greg A. Sachs, Research on the Cognitn·cly lmpaircd: ussons and 
Warnings from the Emergency Research Debate, 45 J. AM. GERIATRL Soc. 474 (1997). 
324See Letter from Jack Schwartz, Maryland Assistant Attorney Gencml, to Multiple 
Recipients (Oct 6, 1999) (on file with the authors). 
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needed to think carefully about the welfare of these research subjects 
and that they are accountable to the public for their decisions. 325 
Most who commented on the new proposal, including some who 
had opposed the Attorney General's original proposal, agreed that it 
represented a step forward, with modest benefits for subjects and no 
appreciable burden on the research enterprise. The pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, however, continued to oppose any additional state 
regulation. Moreover, one influential patient advocacy group also 
opposed the revised proposal, arguing that it was inadequate because it 
did not, for example, prohibit controversial procedures like "washout" 
studies.326 Under the circumstances, the Attorney General concluded 
that the proposal still could not generate sufficient legislative support 
and withdrew it. 
This latest episode in the Maryland policymaking process 
exemplifies the difficulty of trying to achieve consensus even on 
narrow issues in this public, legislative debate. As Kingdon observes, 
policy change can be accomplished if a proposal is "available, worked 
through, and ready to go."327 This cannot now be said about research 
with impaired-capacity subjects. Indeed, the core ethical disagreement 
may never be resolved328 and future legislative and regulatory initiatives 
325 See id. The proposal contains a requirement for IRB review of research, whatever its 
funding source, involving "decisionally incapacitated individuals" and individuals with n 
"potentially incapacitating condition"; a requirement for investigators to describe their plans 
for capacity assessment and assent, together with protection for subjects who refuse to assent; n 
requirement for an IRB to consider the investigator's plans as well as other appropriate 
measures to protect the research subjects, to document the IRB's decisions in its minutes, and 
to respond to valid complaints; and provisions for public access to IRB minutes and approved 
consent documents and for research subject access to research protocols, with protection for 
proprietary information. !d. 
326See supra notes 283-294, and accompanying text. 
327K1NGDON, supra note 233, at 143. 
328In part, this may be a result of a lack of empirical data informing the policy debate. At 
present, we do not know how many decisionally impaired individuals are harmed as a result of 
their participation in research, nor do we know how the various proposals put forward would 
affect actual research e.g., whether they would prevent some beneficial forms of research. Sec, 
e.g., Letter from Laura L. Cain, Esq., Maryland Disability Law Center, to The Honomble 
Walter Baker, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, regarding SB 307, The Decisionally 
Incapacitated Research Subject Protection Act (Mar. 11, 1999) (on file with the authors) 
(stating that "[w]e fmd no credible evidence to support a claim that research or advancements 
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may simply be history repeated: prolonged, contentious debate 
followed by inaction. Against this pessimistic view, however, must be 
set both short-term gains and long-term possibilities. Actual progress 
has been and likely will continue to be registered in less formal ways, 
as funding agencies, academic institutions, IRBs, and researchers adopt 
reforms that they regard as ethically sound and practically feasible. 
This kind of incremental, ad hoc reform is likely to be responsive to 
educational initiatives, the development of professional guidelines, and, 
not least, the possibility (or threat) of formal regulation. Consequently, 
without the pressure that efforts to achieve policy change exerts, 
progress on this front may be elusive. 
An additional reason for continued pursuit of a policy consensus is 
that sometimes years of effort une::-.."}Jectedly pay off. As Kingdon 
points out, the framing of a solution that fits a problem, is broadly 
endorsed by policy advocates, and is politically acceptable often takes 
considerable time. Those working on possible solutions ("'policy 
entrepreneurs," Kingdon calls them) must be willing ''to invest their 
resources-time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money-in the 
hope of a future return."329 Policy advocates need time to refine their 
arguments, engage competing solutions, educate policymakers and the 
public, float trial balloons, and assess technical feasibility and cost. 
"Softening up seems to be necessary before a proposal is taken 
seriously. Many good proposals have fallen on deaf ears because they 
arrived before the general public, the specialized publics, or the policy 
communities were ready to listen. Eventually, such a proposal might 
be resurrected, but only after a period of paving the way.n330 Just as the 
debate over DHEW's proposed rules and the National Commission's 
recommendations began the "softening up" process a quarter-century 
ago, so the three recent governmental initiatives carried it significantly 
forward. For the sake of the research subjects to whom society owes a 
special duty of care, and for the sake of the moral values that should be 
in the treatment of mental disorders or impairments would halt in the absence of a pool of 
decisionally-incapacitated subjects"). 
32bGDON, supra note 233, at 122. 
330/d. at 130. 
HeinOnline -- 3 Depaul J. Health Care L. 608 1999-2000
608 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALm CARE LAW [Vol. 3:547 
at the heart of the research enterprise, governmental agencies or bodies 
should continue to develop regulatory proposals for public review and 
debate. 
